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ABSTRACT




Chair: Joseph N. S. Eisenberg
Dynamic modeling is an important tool for informing public health decisions. In this
dissertation, we explored the role of host immunity in infection transmission models
at the host, population, and multi-population level. We applied these models to two
pathogen systems: 1) anthrax infection at the host level and 2) polio transmission at
the population and multi-population level.
At the host level, dose-response models are used to characterize the risk of infection
given a pathogen exposure and are one of the primary tools for risk assessments.
These models are generally static assuming invariant risk over time. However, if the
temporal response of the immune system to pathogen exposures is of the same time
scale as the temporal patterns of exposure then delivering a dose over a short time
span may result in a higher risk than if that same dose was delivered over a longer
time span. To explore the implications of such an immune response, we developed a
dose-response model that incorporates the immune response to pathogen exposures
and thereby allows risk calculations to be dependent on exposure patterns that vary
over time. We then applied our model to an anthrax system using survival analysis.
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Our analysis indicated that the risk of anthrax is invariant to exposure patterns.
Although the anthrax data set did not reveal a dose timing pattern of risk, more
variable exposure data is needed to fully evaluate this process. We recommend that
future dose-response experiments incorporate variable temporal patterns of exposure
to assess if risk of infection is affected by temporally variant exposures.
At the population level, transmission models elucidate dynamic infection processes
and provide a framework to analyze intervention effectiveness. In the context of polio
eradication, childhood vaccination with oral polio vaccine (OPV) has been the key
intervention to achieve elimination. Final eradication, however, has been elusive
and a better understanding of polio transmission dynamics is important to elucidate
underlying difficulties. It is possible that waning immunity may play an important role
in polio persistence. We developed a model of polio transmission that incorporates
vaccine strain transmission and waning immunity to assess the successes and failures
of the polio eradication campaign. We demonstrated that short-term success through
vaccination policy is possible under diverse transmission conditions. However, long-
term success may be difficult due to reinfection transmission dynamics attributable
to waning immunity. Increased vaccine strain transmission mitigates the influence
of reinfection by boosting immunity but cannot necessarily be relied upon due to
risk of disease caused by circulating OPV. Therefore, for highly transmissive regions,
additional interventions may be appropriate such as boosters in older populations or
improved sanitary conditions.
Another reason that may make final eradication difficult is that at the multi-
population level, vaccination policies may have effects across population groups.
Therefore, we extended our polio transmission model to include migration across
populations. Our analysis demonstrated that if vaccination coverage lapses in one
population, it may be detrimental to the vaccination programs in neighboring popu-
lations. This is exemplified when migration comes from populations with high trans-
xiv
mission levels. Thus eradication strategies should account for the induced immunity
of the disease, particularly where coverage of migratory populations may be crucial to
achieving elimination in the remaining endemic regions. This work demonstrated that





1.1 Background and Motivation
Traditional transmission models have incorporated the role of host immunity in in-
fectious disease transmission in a variety of ways. However, many of these approaches
make simplifying assumptions regarding the nature of these processes. For example,
a susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model assumes that all infected individuals re-
cover into a recovered state described by complete immunity to future infections.
However, immunity is seldom complete or lifelong. An individual’s immune response
may vary over time, where their immunity is strong initially after infection but wanes
over time. Furthermore, host immunity describes a complex system important at
various stages of the infection process. At the time of exposure, the immune system
aims to prevent a pathogen from replicating and initiating infection. When infec-
tion occurs, the immune system then works to remove the pathogen determining how
contagious individuals are and how long infection lasts. Additionally, the effective-
ness of these defenses may vary depending on past exposures. Population contact
with pathogens is a complicated process where characterizing meaningful exposures
requires understanding the interaction between pathogens and the immune system.
These host immunity properties are important at the population level where infectious
contacts occur between individuals. Those with higher immunity levels will partici-
1
pate less in population transmission where they are less likely to get infected and will
have a faster resolution of infection. To take advantage of these properties, interven-
tions are designed induce immunity and reduce population transmission. However,
in the context of connected populations, the intervention policies in one population
may affect another. We aim to understanding how host immunity affects infection
dynamics across these resolutions: the host, population, and multi-population levels.
Initially, we focus on the effect of immunity on risk of infection at the host level.
The ability of the immune system to prevent a pathogen from initiating infection may
depend on the nature of the exposure. For example, a large, immediate exposure
through a sneeze may elicit a different risk of infection than an equivalent exposure
inhaled slowly over time from contaminated air. If the immune response is more
efficient at eliminating small quantities of pathogens, the large, immediate exposure
might elicit a higher risk of infection. Therefore, the dynamic nature of the immune
system may be an important factor determining risk of infection, specifically where
different routes of transmissions result in varying temporal exposure patterns. To
account for this, we developed a dynamic dose-response model incorporating the
immune response in chapter II. We applied our model to a risk assessment framework
in the anthrax disease system.
To incorporate host immunity into population models, we considered immunity as
it affects susceptibility to infection, and how it affects contagiousness and duration if
an infection occurs. Host immunity varies depending on the time since last infection.
In contrast to the SIR model framework, complete immunity is not permanent but the
first level in a series of stages where immunity is waning over time. We applied this
framework to a polio transmission system. Polio eradication is in its final stage; and
at this stage, immunity and cross population dynamics may play an important role
in transmission dynamics. In chapter III, we developed a polio transmission model
incorporating waning immunity and vaccine transmission. In chapter IV, we extended
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this polio transmission model to include migration across heterogeneous populations.
Here, elimination success may be affected by migration due to the interaction of
waning immunity and varying vaccination policy across populations.
1.2 Dynamic modeling of infectious diseases with immunity
1.2.1 Dose-response modeling at the host level
1.2.1.1 Contemporary dose-response models
In chapter II, we developed a dose-response model in the anthrax disease sys-
tem. The role of dose-response models is to characterize the risk of infection given
a pathogen exposure. Dose-response models are used extensively in risk assessment
where risk of infection can be readily calculated for different exposure scenarios [1–3].
Currently, these models are also implemented in environmental transmission models
where pathogens exposures mediated through the environment are assigned probabil-
ities based on dose-response models [4].
The classic dose-response models used for microbial risk assessment are the ex-
ponential and beta-poisson distributional models [2]. These models were devel-
oped under the independent action hypothesis (IAH) assumption that any individual
pathogen unit has a non-zero independent risk of initiating infection. The develop-
ment of exponential model is the most simplistic realization of the IAH. It is derived
by assuming that pathogens from an exposure arrive as a Poisson process with an
expected value equivalent to the total measured dose size. Further, each pathogen has
an independent survival risk, k. The integration of the joint probability of pathogen
arrival and pathogen survival (assumed to be independent distributions) at given ex-
pected dose size yields an exponential distribution with risk parameter, k [2]. Using
any single input dose and a known k risk parameter, a probability of infection can
then be calculated. Furthermore, the exponential model allows risk extrapolations
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(with mechanistic justification) for very small dose sizes which are difficult to eluci-
date experimentally. Low dose exposures are relevant to a variety of scenarios and
risk due to single pathogens has been directly observed for influenza Type A and
intravenous salmonella [5–7].
In the exponential model, we assume that the risk parameter k is a fixed value.
This assumption is relaxed in the beta-Poisson model, where the risk is assumed to
be a distribution that represents variability in the population. To derive this model,
k is assumed to have the beta distribution. By integrating the joint pathogen arrival
and survival distributions as before, we find a mixture distribution that represents
the beta-Poisson dose-response model. By allowing non-constant risk per pathogen,
this two parameter statistical distribution is more flexible at the extremes and can
elicit dose-risk curves that are less steep than the usual exponential models. These
models, however, were developed in a static framework where the risk of infection is
independent of the timing of doses.
1.2.1.2 Limitations of static, time-independent dose-response models
The beta-Poisson and exponential models are time-independent models, limiting
their ability to account for the dynamic effects of the immune system. Particularly, in
the exponential model, infection risk from each pathogen is independent of the time
course they are given, i.e., the overall risk for a total pathogen level is constant for
every exposure pattern. To illustrate the implications of this assumption, consider an
extreme example of an exposure of 50 pathogens instantaneously versus 50 exposures
of a single pathogen separated by a week each. In the exponential model, the overall
risk calculated would be equivalent for each scenario. This approach assumes the
effect of host clearance mechanisms on the elimination of pathogens is a constant
process. However, this may not be true. For example, the immune system might
be very efficient at eliminating low doses of pathogen but less efficient as the total
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pathogen level increases. This would allow higher doses to persist longer in the host
than a series of smaller doses and thus correspond to higher potential for infection to
initiate.
Few studies have taken into account the importance of exposure patterns and
dose-timing. This trend, however, is slowly changing first by incorporating modeling
time post inoculation [8–10]; however, still lacking are risk data where subjects are
exposed to varying exposure patterns in experimental settings. To justify and analyze
these experiments, dose-response models will need to account for time-dependent risk.
The dynamic dose-response model we developed in chapter II provides framework to
design and analyze experiments utilizing time-dependent exposure patterns.
A more biologically motivated dose-response model was previously proposed by
Pujol et al. in 2009 [10]. In this model, innate immune effector particles and pathogens
are modeled in a stochastic competition framework capturing both the growth of
pathogens and diminishing immune response. The model we presented in chapter II
is computationally less intensive than the model in Pujol et al. and therefore more
suitable for integration into a transmission model.
1.2.2 Transmission modeling at the single and multiple population level
1.2.2.1 Overview of polio transmission model
In chapters III and IV, we develop a transmission model that assesses the pop-
ulation dynamics of polio transmission under varying conditions. Our model was
designed to incorporate specific characteristics of polio transmission and the eradica-
tion campaign. These factors include waning immunity, vaccination programs with
multiple boosters per year, the transmission of OPV, and the interaction of multiple
populations. The background for the transmission model framework is described in
sections 1.2.2.2–1.2.2.5 and the specific construction of the polio transmission model
is described in chapters III and IV.
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1.2.2.2 Transmission model framework assumptions
We utilized a deterministic, compartmental model framework. Compartmental
transmission models are structured systems that allow for the dynamics of disease
transmission to be mathematically explored over time using differential equations.
The important assumptions of deterministic, continuous model are that the popula-
tion size is infinite and that population distributions are continuous. These assump-
tions represent simplistic realizations of transmission systems but allow for clear inter-
pretation and flexibility in structures. The use of transmission models to simulate real
world systems allows epidemiologists to assess the effect of potential interventions.
Classic transmission models can take fairly simplistic forms [11]. For example, a
susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model is a two compartment model where pop-
ulations are either infected or susceptible. In this model, infection does not result in
immunity. This assumption may be appropriate if the disease confers no immunity.
Immunity can be added to the framework by employing a SIR structure where infec-
tion resolves into a recovered state where there is full immunity. This extension may
be appropriate for short-term epidemic analysis or for diseases that induce long-term
immunity (e.g., smallpox).
1.2.2.3 Model selection for waning immunity
In polio transmission, immunity to infection is not permanent [12–14], so we em-
ploy a model structure that accommodates for partial and temporary immunity in the
susceptible population. When immunity is not life-long, reinfection dynamics become
an important component of transmission. This is especially relevant in the context
of interventions. An analysis of reinfection dynamics indicate a distinct reinfection
threshold at certain R0 levels [15]. When transmission conditions are below this
threshold, interventions are particularly effective. However, above this threshold, in-
terventions become less effective and reinfection dynamics induce rebound epidemics.
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Our transmission structure is based on assumptions that are somewhere between
the two most extreme assumptions regarding immunity: 1) that infection results in
no immunity (SIS model) or 2) infection results in full and permanent immunity
(SIR model). One simple way to relax the assumption of full immunity is to use a
susceptible-infected-recovered-susceptible (SIRS) model where recovered individuals
eventually become susceptible again. This implies that a given individual has either
complete immunity or complete susceptibility to infection. Given knowledge about
adaptive immunity, this may be a oversimplification of the underlying biology that
could affect model inferences. In chapters III and IV, we expand the SIRS model to
include partial levels of immunity between recovered and fully susceptible. Specifi-
cally, in chapter III, we developed a framework for employing waning immunity in
transmission modeling.
1.2.2.4 Model selection for vaccination and vaccine transmission
Because vaccination is the most important intervention for reducing polio trans-
mission, we included a vaccination rate into our transmission model. The implemen-
tation of vaccination rates in transmission models has been extensively studied [11].
Generally, vaccination rates (particularly childhood vaccination) are modeled such
that a proportion of new births are immediately vaccinated. Under waning immu-
nity framework, employing birthrate vaccination may reduce prevalence to low levels
but sustained transmission remains possible as population immunity wanes over time
[16]. Therefore, for vaccination to be successful without permanent immunity, boost-
ing may be required. In the polio eradication campaign, children may be vaccinated
many times per year [17]. To allow for boosting, we applied the vaccination rate di-
rectly on an age-structured susceptible population to allow for multiple vaccinations
per child.
Because it is a live virus, OPV is transmissible through the same routes as wild po-
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liovirus [18]. OPV, therefore, can vaccinate populations and boost immunity through
transmission processes. To incorporate vaccine strain transmission, we employ a
model structure including infection due to OPV in chapters III and IV. Because the
infection course of OPV is similar to wild polio virus (WPV) but attenuated in terms
of duration and shedding [18], we utilized a similar transmission structure for both
OPV and WPV.
1.2.2.5 Multiple population models
The effect of vaccination programs is not necessarily isolated to a single popula-
tion. Populations are in constant flux and thus the policies in one region may affect
the policies in another depending on their relationship. In chapter III we introduced
key components of polio transmission: the waning of immunity and the transmission
of OPV. Under conditions of waning immunity and vaccine transmission, the effect of
migration on vaccination success may be affected by populations with partial immu-
nity or OPV infection. We therefore expand the single population polio transmission
model to multiple populations in chapter IV.
There are many formulations of spatially connected, multiple population trans-
mission models [11]. In classical metapopulation models, the interaction between
populations is constructed where the populations influence each other but are sep-
arated. This is generally realized by using a weighted force of infection where the
connected populations are coupled depending on their spatial or social relationship.
The abstract assumption regarding population interaction is relaxed in mechanistic
metapopulation models [19, 20]. In these models, explicit population movement is
modeled where a proportion of each population migrates to the other population
where it remains temporarily contributing to the transmission process before return-
ing. Keeling & Rohani [19] explored parameter conditions under which the classical
and mechanistic metapopulaton models are equivalent. Specifically, they derived the
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equivalence between the coupling parameters of the “phenomenological” model and
the movement parameters of the mechanistic model demonstrating the relationship
is disease dependent.
Multi-population models have been used to study the effect of vaccination across
populations [21–25]. The interaction between connected populations have potentially
important effects on vaccination programs in each subpopulation. Specifically, opti-
mal overall vaccination strategies depend on the relationship between connected pop-
ulations. May & Anderson [21] relaxed the assumption of homogeneous population
mixing by allowing heterogeneous populations to interact in a classical metapopu-
lation framework. They demonstrated that, when heterogeneous mixing is assumed
between connected populations, lower total vaccination rates are required to reach
elimination when the subpopulations with the highest contact rates are the focus of
intervention. However, an extension of this model showed that targeting populations
with the highest levels of interaction may be more important as demonstrated by re-
gional difficulties in smallpox eradication [22]. A recent transmission model utilizing
explicit migration and vaccination intervention indicated that in an SIR model with
fully coupled migration, vaccination rates in one population could be used to benefit
the other [25].
In the polio endemic regions, migration is an important demographic feature.
The types of migration in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria vary (e.g., rural/urban,
seasonal, refugees, etc.) but vaccination rates are lower in migratory populations
[26–28]. Recent success in India has been partially attributed to stronger focus on
migratory families [29] where lower vaccination rates were previously observed in rural
migrants in northern India [30]. A general population migration structure relevant to
polio transmission is depicted in figure 1.1.
To assess the effect of under-vaccinated migratory populations on a given popu-
lation, the model presented in chapter IV utilizes unidirectional migration. In figure
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1.1, this would be described by having no return arrow to the source population and
instant integration of migrants into the destination population. Unidirectional popu-
lation movement implies that vaccination or transmission conditions in the destination
population cannot affect the source population. This might describe rural-urban mi-
gration where migrants are unlikely to return to their home regions. This approach
can also be interpreted abstractly, where the source population represents an aggre-
gate of migratory populations that come from different transmission or vaccination
conditions. In either interpretation, we would not expect policies in the destination
population to affect people in the source population.
Source Population Destination Population
Migrants
Figure 1.1:
A general population migration structure. Individuals from a source pop-
ulation explicitly move to a destination population, where they could stay
but remain separated, migrate to another population, integrate with the
destination population, or return home. Transmission depends on the re-
lationship between the migrants and the destination population and how
the pathogen is transmitted. For example, a refugee model might be struc-
tured such that migrants and the destination population are partitioned
and transmission occurs through preferential mixing. A rural/urban mi-
gration model might be structured such that populations from source
rural areas migrate and then integrate quickly into the urban destination
population where return rates are low.
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1.3 Immunity and pathogen background
1.3.1 Background on biology of the immune system
Our analysis focused on the efficiency of the immune system in preventing infection
and attenuating future infections. While certain aspects of the immune system were
not specifically modeled, it is important to understand the underlying biology of
the human immune system and immune response. The human immune system is a
biological system designed to detect and prevent disease [31]. It targets a wide range
of pathogenic organisms, viruses, and tumor cells. The immune system is generally
broken into two categories, the innate and adaptive immune system. The innate
immune system is considered the first line of defense characterized as fast but not
very specific. The adaptive immune system is much slower to respond but is much
more specific to the type of infection. However, components from both work together
in response to potential infection or disease. The immune system is characterized by
its ability to discriminate between host cells and foreign cells, maintain memory of
past infections, and coordinate specific responses to specific pathogens.
In chapter II, we built a dynamic dose-response model incorporating the effects of
the innate immune system. Furthermore, the innate immune response is important to
the anthrax infection process. The innate immune system is characterized by very a
fast but non-specific response [32] drive by three important cell types: macrophages,
dendritic cells, and natural killer (NK) cells. Macrophages circulate in the peripheral
blood system and function by ingesting pathogenic agents and then chemically elimi-
nating them [31]. To identify potential threats, macrophage and dendritic cells carry
receptors called pattern recognition receptors. These cells are crucial for recognition,
memory, and continued protection against encountered antigens [32].
In chapters III and IV, our analysis focused on polio transmission and vaccination
in the context of waning immunity. Immunity against polio infection is mostly de-
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scribed by the adaptive system, which is characterized by a highly specified but slow
response to infection. One important job of the innate immune system is to hold off
infection long enough so the adaptive immune response can be activated. The cells
of the adaptive immune system are lymphocytes; specifically T cells and B cells.
Plasma cells (mature B cells) are lymphocytes primarily associated with the hu-
moral immune response with the primary job of secreting antibodies [31]. Antibodies
combine with other immune effectors to more efficiently eliminate an infection. The
effect of antibodies on pathogenic particles and cells is the defining feature of the hu-
moral immune system. The classic pathway complement system is characterized by
immunoglobulins aiding immune cells in the elimination of pathogenic cells through
phagocytosis or direct lysis. Antibody classes IgG and IgM bind to antigenic struc-
tures and form complexes that are more easily eliminated by immune cells. IgA, an
antibody associated with mucosal immunity, does not strongly induce the complement
system but prevents pathogens from replicating.
The immune system response varies by type of pathogen encountered where some
responses are more efficient than others. In the context of anthrax and polio, there
are differences in how the immune system responds and how it contributes to disease.
Anthrax symptoms stem from damage caused to cells by the use of exo-toxins and
encapsulation [33]. Poliovirus replicates at the naso-pharyngeal exposure site and
eventually travels to the gastrointestinal tract causing sub-clinical infection [34]. Both
pathogens are able to disseminate. Poliovirus causes poliomyelitis when it invades
the nervous system while B. anthracis can cause severe disease at infection site and
through dissemination in the lymph system.
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1.3.2 Biological characteristics of Bacillus anthracis and disease
1.3.2.1 Background on anthrax
Bacillus anthracis and anthrax were the focus of the dose-response model built in
Chapter II. Anthrax is a disease that manifests differently depending on the location
of exposure. Infection can occur on the skin, in the respiratory system, or in the
gastrointestinal tract. The causative agent of anthrax is the spore-forming bacteria
Bacillus anthracis. B. anthracis is a very resilient pathogenic bacteria that can live
in soil and generally infects herbivores. Human exposure of anthrax generally occurs
upon contact with spores in the environment. Spores are not generally transmitted
person to person [33, 35].
Bacillus anthracis is a gram positive, spore-forming, rod-shaped bacterium that
can cause extracellular infection in animal hosts. It is the most lethal and pathogenic
species of the Bacillus family. Spore formation in aerobic bacteria is a unique charac-
teristic of the Bacillus family[36]. The endospores created by the bacteria are highly
resistant to harsh environmental conditions and may persist for very long periods
of time (decades) in soil. Spore formation occurs when harsh environmental cues
and oxygen are detected. B. anthracis is also capable of producing a poly-glutamate
capsule to resist phagocytosis from macrophages [33].
A spore may remain in the lungs for weeks before infection occurs [37]. B. an-
thracis releases two powerful and lethal exo-toxins, lethal toxin and edema toxin,
which contribute to severe damage to the lungs tissue and cells. Symptoms begin
to manifest as the classic flu-like symptoms such as malaise and fever. Disease may
then quickly progress to respiratory distress, cyanosis, massive edema, and poten-
tially death [36]. Dissemination of the bacteria into the lymph system may also lead
to bacteremia and toxemia which is characteristic of severe and potentially fatal dis-
ease. Due to the lethality of the toxins, proper antibiotic may still be ineffective in
13
prevention of respiratory failure and ultimately death [33].
1.3.2.2 Process of infection and immune response for anthrax infection
While the sites of infection result in different symptoms, the process of infections
for cutaneous anthrax and inhalation anthrax are similar. Pathogenesis in the lungs
results in lung tissue damage and symptoms of pneumonia while pathogenesis for
skin infection is described by the progression of the lesion [33]. In an exposed host,
the bacterial spores begin germinating in both extracellular locations and within
macrophages. Replicating bacteria excrete toxins and form capsules that primarily
affect macrophages. The use of a polyglutamate capsule prevents macrophages from
using phagocytosis to destroy the pathogen and it is just one of its methods for
evading immune response .
The major source of anthrax symptoms are caused by cell damage due to exo-
toxins. To be pathogenic, the edema factor and lethal factor must combine with the
protective antigen to form the respective toxins. Protective antigen creates channels
on host cell membranes and thus allows the lethal factor and edema factor to enter
the cell and cause damage. Lethal toxin causes protein degradation in macrophages,
which leads to apoptosis and necrosis within 2 hours [35]. Action of the toxin on the
surrounding tissue will also lead to necrosis. It is also believed that the two toxins
work together in inhibiting cytokine release from macrophages [38]. Specifically, both
inhibit the release of TNF-α which greatly hinders the ability of the innate immune
system to mount a defense against the infection. Furthermore, edema toxin is shown
to inhibit the cytokine IL-12 which is crucial to both innate recruitment and activation
of Th1 cells to mediate an adaptive response [38]. Edema toxin works by increasing
intracellular cyclic AMP (cAMP)[39]. In macrophages, this disrupts the release of
a variety of cytokines and results in an inflammatory response described by over
swelling, or edema. The use of these two toxins on macrophages explains why the
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immune system rarely develops an effective adaptive response.
A major complication of anthrax infection is the dissemination of the pathogen
into the lymph system and then throughout the body. When macrophages ingest
anthrax spores they generally are able to eliminate the spore using phagocytosis.
In some instances, the macrophage is lysed and the bacteria escape to replicate.
However, in another possibility, the spores survive, germinate, and then replicate in
a vegetative form in the macrophages [40]. Once transported to a lymph node, the
bacteria are capable of releasing toxin and lysing the macrophage. The bacteria may
then infect the lymph node and use the lymph system to spread throughout the body
where the toxins can cause systematic damage resulting in very severe or fatal disease.
1.3.2.3 Public health threat of anthrax attacks
In Chapter II, we constructed a dose-response model and analyzed anthrax infec-
tion data. Because anthrax is not transmitted person-to-person, it is not generally
considered a natural infectious disease threat. Before the 2001 release, no case had
occurred in the United States in 25 years and the last major world outbreak occurred
in 1979 due to a major contamination leak event from a Soviet Union biological
weapons plant [41]. Due to its high virulence as a pneumonic disease, anthrax use
as a weapon represents a public health concern. Disease may manifest quickly and
present as severe respiratory distress potentially leading to death [36]. Furthermore,
proper antibiotic use may still be ineffective in prevention of respiratory failure and
ultimately death [33]. As a public health concern, the factors to consider to prepare
for and to handle anthrax exposure include risk assessment, cost analysis of treatment
prophylaxis, vaccination, and cleanup [42]. In 2001, for example, the decontamination
along the trail of exposure totaled over $20 million.
Risk assessment is an important tool to prepare for potential bioterrorism threats
[3]. Dose-response models are a key component of these risk assessments because
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they quantify differing exposure scenarios into an infection risk calculation. Our
dose-response model presented in chapter II accounts for temporally variable expo-
sure patterns whereas previous dose-response models generally use simple exposure
assumptions to calculate risk. The model is able to account for varying exposure pat-
terns by incorporating immune system dynamics. Our dynamic dose-response model
is thus a versatile tool that can implemented in more complicated risk assessments
where exposure patterns may be important.
1.3.3 Poliovirus infection and poliomyelitis
1.3.3.1 Epidemiology of poliovirus
In chapters III and IV, we focused on the study of poliovirus and its transmis-
sion. Poliomyletis is a viral disease caused by three subtypes of poliovirus, a human
enterovirus [43]. Polio transmission occurs through the fecal-oral and oral-oral route.
Thus polio is able to transmit extensively in regions with poor sanitation.
Poliovirus is a subtype of enteric viruses which are known to survive in the en-
vironment; experiments have shown that poliovirus persists in food, water, soil, and
on fomites for prolonged periods of times, ranging from days to weeks [44]. There-
fore, human interaction with the environment may be an important component of the
transmission process. Because poliovirus is excreted through gastrointestinal routes,
proper sanitation measures may reduce exposure through environmental sources.
Poliovirus causes poliomyelitis, a generally asymptomatic gastrointestinal disease
[43]. Non-specific symptoms occur in less than 10% of infections. However, a rare
and serious complication can occur if poliovirus infection enters the central nervous
system and causes neurological disease. In these cases, less than 1% of infections,
acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) may occur. AFP is a seriously debilitating illness that
can be permanent. Of the poliovirus subtypes, type 1 infection has the highest rate
of AFP occurrence.
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Poliovirus transmission is controlled worldwide using vaccination. Only three
nations, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan, still have sustained endemicity while
infrequent outbreaks occur in neighboring regions [45]. The use of vaccination has
substantially reduced cases of poliomyelitis globally where eradication may soon be-
come a reality [46].
1.3.3.2 Poliovirus infection and immunity
Poliovirus, of genus enterovirus, is a positive-sense RNA virus that primarily in-
fects humans [34]. Infection occurs when poliovirus enters the body, generally through
the nasopharyngeal route and binds to a specific poliovirus receptor (PVR) on a host
cell. Poliovirus is able to then rapidly replicate and spread via bloodstream or lymph
system to its primary replication site in the gastrointestinal tract. The virus can
replicate and be excreted from the gastrointestinal tract for several weeks. During
acute viremia, the virus may potentially enter the central nervous systems and cause
aseptic meningitis or AFP through a process called retrograde axonal transport.
Immunity to poliovirus is maintained through antibody secretion. Mucosal immu-
nity is generated through IgA production which may prevent or attenuate infection of
the GI tract [34]. Induced serum IgG may prevent future poliovirus viremia. While
immunity to paralysis may be lifelong, immunity to infection may wane over time
[12–14, 47].
Two vaccine are currently in use: inactivated polio vaccine (inactivated polio vac-
cine (IPV)) and oral polio vaccine (OPV). Both vaccines induce immunity to paralysis
[17] but OPV induces higher protection against future infections [14, 48, 49]. Both
OPV and IPV generate serum IgG conversion, likely associated with preventing paral-
ysis, but only OPV induces GI mucosal immunity through IgA production [34]. That
is, OPV is more useful to prevent future infection but both vaccines are suitable to
prevent against poliomyelitis complications. Therefore, the choice of vaccine depends
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on the goal of the intervention. To reduce transmission in endemic nations and re-
gions that are still at risk for infection, OPV is generally employed. The drawback,
however, is that OPV strains can be transmitted and cause disease. Therefore, under
conditions where polio has been eliminated and infection is unlikely, IPV is employed.
To induce immunity for all three subtypes of WPV, a trivalent oral polio vac-
cine (tOPV) has been in use during the eradication campaign [48]. The tOPV in-
duced the highest immunity against type 2 WPV [34], which has been eradicated, so
recent efforts in India have focused on monovalent oral polio vaccine (mOPV) types
1 and 3 to target the remaining strains [29]. As an attenuated live vaccine, OPV is
transmissible which allows for natural population boosting [18]. However, circulating
vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV) can also cause paralytic disease and thus ces-
sation of OPV is an important final step in eradication.
1.3.3.3 Global polio eradication
In 1988, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) began a campaign to rid
the world of polio. Since the induction of the initiative, there has been global success
with significant reduction in transmission worldwide, eradication of type 2 WPV, and
elimination of all poliovirus subtypes from all but three nations [46]. However, the
final stages of polio eradication have been characterized by prolonged difficulty in
reaching the final goal of eradication. Recently achieved success in India has been
bittersweet as transmission continues in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria. In 2011,
an Independent Monitoring Board (IMB) review of the campaign indicted the GPEI
with blunt commentary regarding its ineffectiveness in the final stages [50]. The GPEI
has since responded and hopes to see improvement by the end of 2012.
Polio eradication has proven difficult in poorer areas of the world, specifically,
Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and northern areas of India [17]. Although India
has managed recent elimination success, polio persists in the other three countries.
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While the GPEI works to achieve elimination, previously eliminated nations have
experienced periodic outbreaks when coverage slips, specifically in countries bordering
Nigeria and Pakistan [45]. To reduce the risk of future outbreaks due to importation,
it is of great public health significance to reach eradication as soon as possible.
Previous failure in India has been attributed to many causes, including lack of
sanitation, improper vaccination of children, and high transmission conditions [29].
Further, reduced IgG seroconversion rates indicated that competing enteric infections
were preventing OPV from inducing an immune response [17]. Despite these condi-
tions, India managed elimination success through a highly vitalized campaign that
updated vaccine selection, drastically increased vaccination children rates, and tar-
geted previously hard to reach populations [29]. Persistence in Afghanistan, Nigeria,
and Pakistan has been attributed to many causes including population aversion to
vaccination [51, 52], failure of governance to adequately ensure vaccination [53] and
continuous transmission across borders [46, 54].
After over 20 years of effort to eradicate polio, it may become difficult to sustain
these high level public health efforts. Currently, it costs $1 billion per year and intense
public health efforts to maintain the status quo [50]. The transmission model analyses
presented in Chapters III and IV aim to elucidate the current underlying difficulties
in eradication, highlight how success has occurred, inform alternative intervention
strategies, and provide a framework for evaluating future eradication efforts.
1.4 Specific Aims
Aim 1
Rationale: Dose-response models are utilized to translate a pathogen exposure into
a risk of infection or disease. Currently, these models are primarily focused on single
exposure events that are intrinsically time-independent processes. However, in real
world scenarios, exposure events could be described in a variety of patterns depending
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on routes of transmission.
Hypothesis: Depending on the dose received, the host immune system can be over-
whelmed and therefore repeated inoculations over time affect the probability of any
single pathogen initiating the infection process.
Implementation: We developed a dose-response model that is a function of the dose-
pattern received and is dependent on the clearance rate of the immune system. Fur-
thermore, combined with previous data, a statistical method was developed to analyze
time series data where infection events are occurring amid inoculation events.
Aim 2
Rationale: The GPEI has experienced worldwide success through the use of childhood
vaccination programs to eliminate polio transmission. However, several countries and
regions, characterized by poor vaccination coverage and high transmission conditions,
still experience transmission. Because polio immunity wanes over time, reinfection
dynamics may play an important role in sustained transmission.
Hypothesis: Failure of polio eradication programs in transmissive regions occurs due
to waning immunity and low transmission of the live OPV. Reinfection in older popu-
lations with waned immunity helps sustain transmission despite adequate vaccination
coverage in children.
Implementation: A transmission model was built incorporating waning immunity al-
lowing previously infected populations to be reinfected by wild polio. Further, the
model incorporates transmission of OPV. Prevalence outcomes were then explored
in this model for varying levels of transmission (R0), vaccination rates, transmission
levels of OPV, and waning immunity rates.
Aim 3
Rationale: The polio eradication campaign is a global effort to eradicate polio. Po-
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liomyelitis incidence has been significantly reduced using childhood vaccination as
implemented through the cooperation of the GPEI and national public health pro-
grams. The final endemic regions are characterized by poor vaccination coverage,
mobile populations, and moderate to high transmission conditions. Because trans-
mission occurs across borders, populations are interdependent entities with respect
to vaccination effectiveness.
Hypothesis: Migration can affect vaccination programs due to differing vaccination
policies and transmission conditions across populations.
Implementation: This model was a modification of a previous transmission model
of polio that implements both the effects of waning immunity and age based vac-
cination programs. Specifically, we developed a transmission model incorporating
migration between populations to explore how differing vaccination implementation
affect prevalence levels in neighboring populations.
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CHAPTER II
A dynamic dose-response model to account for
exposure patterns in risk assessment: a case study
in inhalation anthrax
2.1 Abstract
The most commonly used dose-response models implicitly assume that accumu-
lation of dose is a time-independent process where each pathogen has a fixed risk
of initiating infection. Immune particle neutralization of pathogens, however, may
create strong time-dependence; i.e., temporally clustered pathogens have a better
chance of overwhelming the immune particles than pathogen exposures that occur at
lower levels for longer periods of time. In environmental transmission systems, we ex-
pect different routes of transmission to elicit different dose-timing patterns and thus
potentially different realizations of risk. We present a dose-response model that cap-
tures time dependence in a manner that incorporates the dynamics of initial immune
response. We then demonstrate the parameter estimation of our model in a dose-
response survival analysis using empirical time series data of inhalational anthrax in
monkeys in which we find slight dose-timing effects. Future dose-response experi-
ments should include varying the time pattern of exposure in addition to varying the
total doses delivered. Ultimately, the dynamic dose-response paradigm presented here
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will improve modeling of environmental transmission systems where different systems
have different time patterns of exposure.
2.2 Introduction
Dose response functions are central to microbial risk assessments. In transmission
systems, dose-response modeling is important in evaluating risk given an environ-
mental pathogen exposure. Exposure occurs when susceptible individuals contact a
pathogen source, usually an environmental reservoir or an infected individual. These
exposure events can be characterized by the frequency and magnitude of pathogens
that reach a susceptible host. The route of transmission, exposure behaviors, and
physical aspects of the system will cause the dose-timing patterns of pathogen expo-
sure to vary. For example, in influenza transmission, a direct pathogen exposure from
a sneeze may be characterized as a large bolus exposure event while aerosolized ex-
posure may be constant over a long period of time but exposure consists of a smaller
number of pathogens at any given time.
Biologically, the immune system may handle varying exposure patterns with vary-
ing efficiency. Pathogen inoculations that occur very close together may carry a com-
parable risk of infection to an equivalent total dose occurring at a point in time if
the immune response is slow compared to the period of exposure for the repeated
doses. Longer periods between pathogen exposures, however, may allow the immune
system to eliminate the pathogen and recover between each inoculation. The rates at
which the immune system responds and clears the pathogen are clearly important in
determining the accumulation of multiple inoculations. For these extreme instances,
short versus long inoculation intervals, we can conclude that inoculations either ac-
cumulate as a sum or should be considered as separate events. However, it becomes
unclear how accumulation of pathogen levels within the host may vary for patterns
that occur on a time scale where the innate immune system has begun to respond
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but failed to clear all the pathogens.
Immune response is variable depending on many factors such as pathogen type,
location of pathogen, and prior exposure. We specifically focus on the dynamics of
the initial immune response. This includes the innate immune response, natural host
barriers (e.g., mucosal clearance), and potentially standing elements of the acquired
immune response. It is possible, however, that given long enough time frames of
exposures that the adaptive immune response will also act as an initial response to
future inoculations. Our hypothesis is that these initial host protections are not
constant in nature, and that repeated inoculations affect the probability of any single
pathogen initiating the infection process.
The classic dose-response models used for microbial risk assessment are the expo-
nential and beta-poisson distributional models [2]. These models calculate the risk
of infection for a single dose value. Parameters for these models are empirically in-
formed using animal dosing experiments in which varying single bolus pathogen doses
are given to animals and infection or disease is monitored [1, 5]. In environmental
infection transmission systems where the environment is not just a source but is a
medium of pathogen transport between individuals, these models are justified for the
extreme scenarios of very closely spaced or very distantly spaced exposures described
above. In these scenarios, the probability of infection can be calculated indepen-
dently for each dosing event. However, for other exposure patterns, total within host
pathogen level at a given inoculation time is dependent on remaining pathogen levels
from past inoculations. In these cases the state of the system (i.e., the number of liv-
ing pathogens and the number of immune elements available to fight them) after any
defined interval is dependent on the clearance rate of pathogens and the destruction
and recruitment rate of standing immune elements. Here we define standing elements
as those elements existing or that would have appeared on their own in the absence
of new immune element generation due to an acquired immune response.
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The exponential and beta-poisson models make implicit assumptions about how
multiple pathogens interact to cause infection. Under the independent action hy-
pothesis (IAH), any individual pathogen is capable of initiating infection with some
independent probability [2]. The traditional dose-response models operate under this
paradigm. This hypothesis, however, is generally considered only under single in-
oculation scenarios. We contend that, even though a single pathogen is capable of
initiating infection, the infectivity of a pathogen may depend on the state of the im-
mune system, which in turn is affected by prior inoculations. This is in contrast to
the IAH that pathogen risk probability is independent of other pathogens. It also
deviates from a threshold model in that the risk of infection given any inoculation
size is still never zero.
One aim for this model will be future integration into transmission models. Par-
ticularly, in transmission models, when we specifically consider pathogen exposure
from the environment, we must translate an exposure event into a probability of in-
fection. This could be done using the exponential or beta-poisson models but these
models potentially ignore exposure dynamics associated with different routes of ex-
posures, as discussed in the exposure scenarios above. Although a more biologically
motivated dose-response model was previously proposed [10], we present here a model
that is computationally less intensive and therefore more suitable for integration into
a transmission model. In Pujol et al. [10], innate immune effector particles and
pathogens are modeled in a stochastic competition model capturing both the growth
of pathogens and diminishing immune response. In our model, we aim to capture
these dynamics with a simple model that does not explicitly model the immune dy-
namics. This satisfies the goals of dose-response at the transmission or population
level by allowing utilization of an exposure pattern (history of inoculations) into the
calculation of the probability of infection. Our model provides a framework to re-
alistically relax the assumption of dose independence in a biologically plausible yet
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computationally efficient manner that implicitly incorporates the dynamics of the
immune system. Furthermore, we present a statistical method to analyze such time
series data where infection events are occurring amid inoculation events. Experi-
mental data to inform a time-dependent dose-response model are extremely rare, but
there are data from a 1966 study on inhalation anthrax in monkeys that incorpo-
rates varying exposure patterns and time to death data [55]. Even though this study
was not specifically designed to study varying risk by exposure patterns, our analysis
provides direction for more informative future dose-response experiments that will
incorporate time-dependent dosing patterns.
2.3 Methods
2.3.1 Overview
The methods section will describe the construction of our time-dependent dose-
response model followed by its application to time-series anthrax dose-response data.
The first three sections describe the development of the model in a general framework
focusing on the clearance of pathogens within a host and the probability of infection
take-off during the clearance time frame. Section 2.3.2 mathematically describes the
within host-pathogen level at any given time after a point source inoculation and then
section 2.3.3 extrapolates this process to multiple inoculations. Section 2.3.4 describes
the development of a hazard for infection at a given time post-inoculation. At this
point, enough information is provided to use this time-dependent dose-response model
to make risk calculations given a parameterization. Particularly, it could be used in
a transmission model setting to translate multiple exposure events into an infection
risk calculation. The last three sections pertain to analyzing data. Section 2.3.5
uses the hazard to develop a likelihood statistic suitable for analyzing time-series
dose-response data. To further analyze the data we have, we must make further
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assumptions concerning the data which are described in detail in Section 2.3.6. Sec-
tion 2.3.7 describes our exploration of the results from section 2.3.6 in more controlled
experimental settings.
2.3.2 Time Dependent Pathogen Clearance
Our model aims to describe the clearance of pathogen until either the pathogen is
eliminated or the pathogen establishes infection. To capture the dose-timing region
between the extremes discussed above, a model should reflect decreasing ability of
the immune system to inactivate pathogens as pathogens accumulate and immune
elements are consumed. The differential equation in equation (2.1) illustrates such a
model, where t represents time and P (t) is a function representing the total within
host pathogen level at a given time. The parameter γ roughly approximates a net
per-pathogen clearance rate. The pathogen clearance rate is also affected by a shaping





To keep this model biologically plausible we consider the domain of γ to be in
the interval (0,∞) and the domain of α to be in the interval [0, 1]. When α = 1, γ
becomes the per capita rate of decay of within host pathogen and the decay curve
takes the exponential shape. In this case, the pathogens die-out is a linear function
of the total number of pathogens P , i.e., the immune system is equally effective
in eliminating one pathogen regardless of the current number of pathogens in the
system. The state of the immune system, therefore, is irrelevant since its efficacy to
eliminate pathogens is constant. When α is less than one, this per capita change, γ,
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is attenuated by the factor, 1/P 1−α. That is, the effectiveness of the immune system
is dependent on the total number of within host pathogens. As α decreases and
approaches zero, the shape of decay becomes more linear and slower for a fixed γ.
Therefore, the parameter α can also be biologically described as the degree to which
the immune system can be overwhelmed by pathogen level. For a single inoculation,
the decay curve is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Given a total dose of 100 pathogens,
the curve represents the total within host pathogen level at any given time over the
course of clearance for varying values of α over two fixed values of γ.
By considering a negative differential equation, we are modeling under the as-
sumption that the total within host pathogen level, or the infection hazard, is strictly
decreasing. Biologically, our assumption is that after an inoculation, on average, the
rate of pathogen reproduction is less than the rate of pathogen clearance. If this
inequality reverses, that is pathogen reproduction becomes greater than pathogen
clearance on average, this would correspond to the pathogen establishing infection.
This assumption may not be suitable for all pathogens depending on biological traits,
particularly the pathogens ability to replicate within our time scale of interest.
2.3.3 Dose Clearance and Multiple Dosing
We propose to use this function to calculate an effective dose for risk assessments
when multiple inoculations occur within a biologically relevant time frame. To do
this, we must first evaluate the solution to equation (2.1) with initial condition given
at time 0, d = P (0), where d is a single inoculation given at time 0.




d · e−tγ, α = 1
(tγ(α− 1) + d1−α)
1
1−α , α ∈ [0, 1)




Shape and rate of within host dose decay by levels of α and γ. While the
shape of decay is dependent only on α , the rate of decay is a dependent
on both α and γ.
To ensure that P (t, d) > 0, we implement the last constraint in equation (2.2),
where P (t, d) is absorbed at 0 after te, the time of extinction for a given inoculation.
The closed form solution for the time of extinction for a single inoculation is given by
equation (2.3). Note that even though te is unbounded when α = 1, the dose function
(an exponential decay function) takes on small values fairly quickly for a fixed γ as t






γ(1− α) , α < 1
∞, α = 1
(2.3)
In multiple exposure scenarios, the input doses for this model are represented by a
sequence of inoculations such as those illustrated in the top two graphs((a) and (b)) in
Figure 2.2. Each inoculation, di, is received instantaneously at a designated time, ti.
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Formally, we map a one to one correspondence between a sequence of n inoculations,
{di}ni=1 , and a sequence of n inoculation times, {ti}
n
i=1. In a study, we observe
subjects in real time (or close to) and record a corresponding final observation time,
T . This final observation time, T , can occur in any interval between inoculations,
ti ≤ T ≤ ti+1 or after the final inoculation time, tn < T . Further, for a subject j, the
total inoculations experienced before an infection event or censoring may be less than
n, so we can denote the subject specific sequence size to be nj with corresponding
final observation time, Tj.
Now that multiple dosing situations have been introduced, we can consider eval-
uation of equation (2.2) for multiple inoculations. Since past inoculations may still
be present at the time of a new inoculation, the dose function must incorporate the
sequence of all past inoculations up to time, t. We can picture the multiple dose
time function as a series of decay curves with discontinuity jumps occurring at each
inoculation point, illustrated in the bottom two graphs((c) and (d)) of Figure 2.2.
Particularly, the total within host pathogen level at any inoculation time, ti, is the
sum of the current inoculation, di, and the remaining within host pathogens, pi. The
remaining pathogen level is described in equation (2.4) recursively using equation
(2.2). When α = 1, the remaining pathogen level can be defined as an independent





0, i = 1




−γ(ti−tj), i > 1 ∩ α = 1
(2.4)
Since equation (2.4) describes the points of discontinuity at inoculation times,
we can use it to reconstruct equation (2.2) to utilize multiple dose arguments. The
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following function is the multiple dose function




pk + dk, t = tk
P (t− tk, pk + dk), tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1
(2.5)
This function can be interpreted as the total within host pathogen level at a given
time, t, given all past inoculation up to that time. The function is jump discontinuous
in that it decreases and is absorbed at 0 (by construction in equation (2.2)) but
has point increases at inoculation times, ti by an inoculation value, di. Note that,
given a time sufficiently greater than the time of the last inoculation, this equation
approaches zero under the same conditions as equation (2.2). The time to extinction,
te, after inoculation time ti, can still be calculated using equation (2.3) but with input
dose, pi + di, instead of di. When α = 1, the function approaches zero quickly with
decreasing error as t  tk since the true convergence time is in the limit, t → ∞,
discussed in detail in the appendix, section A.2.
2.3.4 Dose-Response Risk from Multiple Dose Function
We consider an effective dose to be any value calculated from equation (2.2) that
could contribute to an infection hazard at any given time. To evaluate the accumu-
lated effective dose in a given host, we integrate equation (2.2), over a time period of
interest. For a single inoculation, the closed form solution for the effective dose from
inoculation to extinction is
∫ te
0
P (t, d) dt =
d2−α
γ(2− α) (2.6)
When there are multiple inoculations, the accumulated effective dose is a sum of
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Figure 2.2:
Example of two different inoculation patterns (above) and the time-
evolution of pathogen numbers within the host (below). The models
parameters are e α = 0.5 and γ = 0.05. The patterns of inoculation
correspond to two different multiple inoculation scenarios: 20 inoculation
events of 2 pathogens each (left), and 4 inoculation events of 10 pathogens
each (right). Although the total inoculated dose (40 pathogens) and the
time of exposure (200 minutes) is the same, it is visually evident that
pathogens from the four inoculation events persist longer in the immune
system.
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integrals over the continuous sections of the multiple dose function. This is seen in
equation (2.7), for any time, T , before the final within host pathogen extinction. If
T = tk, or the upper bound of the integral is equivalent to an inoculation time, the
last term of equation (2.7) is zero.
∫ T
0










P (t, pk + dk)dt (2.7)
To evaluate the accumulated effective dose through final pathogen extinction, we
simply replace the final term of equation (2.7) with equation (2.6) with pn + dn (the
initial pathogen level at the final inoculation) substituted for d. For α = 1 and
T  tn, we can still substitute in equation (2.6) with small error, this is discussed in
greater detail in the appendix, section A.2.
To consider how α determines the importance of dose timing, consider an en-
tire dose course over an exposure pattern, for example, the top two graphs in figure
2.2, where we have two distinct exposure patterns of 40 pathogens given over 200
minutes. The accumulated effective dose over this time can be calculated using the
integral given in equation (2.7). When α = 1, the accumulation of inoculations is an
independent process, as illustrated in equation (2.4) due to the exponential memo-
ryless property. Because of this property, the total effective dose over the exposure
period is the sum of the inoculations divided by γ. This solution holds for all potential
dosing patterns evaluated through effective extinction T  tn when α = 1, discussed
further in the appendix, section A.2.
When α < 1, however, the pathogen clearance rate depends on the within host
pathogen level. Under these conditions, the total effective dose is dependent on the
timing of given inoculations. For α = 0.5, the accumulated effective dose (the area
under the curve) differs across dosing patterns despite the sums of the inoculations
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both totaling 40 pathogens (see the bottom two graphs of figure 2). Although the
total inoculated dose (40 pathogens) and the time of exposure (200 minutes) is the
same, it is visually evident that pathogens from the four inoculation events persist
longer.
The goal of our model is to analyze decaying hazard post inoculation, until ei-
ther the pathogen is cleared or the pathogen takes hold and initiates infection prior
to clearance. We now introduce the risk of infection due to a single pathogen per
unit time that is present in the immune system, s. This formulation is a one-hit
model of infection; i.e., a single pathogen unit is capable of initiating infection. This
phenomenon has been shown empirically for pathogens such as influenza A [7] and
intravenous salmonella exposure [6]. However, unlike the exponential formulation of
a one hit model, each hit does not have identical and independent risk. Instead, risks
are dependent upon prior hits and thus α and γ also contribute to the calculation of
the risk.
For an instantaneous risk associated to a single pathogen, s, and the current
number of pathogens within the host, P , we can calculate the force of infection,
i.e. the probability of a susceptible individuals becoming infected, sP (t)dt. This is
evaluated at each time step. For multiple inoculations, we insert our multiple dose
function. We can interpret this as a hazard function, λ(T ), given in equation (2.8).
λ(T )dt = sP (T, {di}ki=1)dt (2.8)
By integrating and exponentiating the hazard over an interval time up to time,
T , we can calculate the survival function, or the probability of not being infected by
time, T , given as follows
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i=1)dt = 1− Pr(Infection by Time,T) (2.9)
We now have a corresponding risk of 1− S(T ), which matches the familiar func-
tional form of the exponential dose-response model. If we consider T  tn, then
this risk corresponds to the risk of an entire exposure pattern. When α = 1 and
there is a single inoculation event and clearance, the single pathogen risk parameter,
k, from the exponential model is equivalent to the ratio s/γ. Furthermore, contin-
uing to assume complete pathogen clearance, this equivalence holds for all exposure
patterns when α = 1. This relationship is lost when α < 1 as pathogen clearance,
and thus risk, becomes dependent on the size and timing of inoculations. That is,
when α < 1, the equivalence of the exponential function and our cumulative dose
risk function is dependent on the inoculation size. Mathematical explorations of the
relationship between the exponential model and our model when α = 1 are discussed
in the appendix, section A.2.
2.3.5 Likelihood statistic and parameter estimation from data
By multiplying the hazard and survival function we can calculate the probability
density for infection at a final observation time, T, standard in a survival analysis.
This is given in equation (2.10).
f(T ) = S(T )λ(T ) (2.10)
To estimate the model parameters using time-dependent exposure data including
time of infection, we propose a likelihood statistic derived from survival analysis
framework. The likelihood is formulated depending on a subject j’s infection status
given by ∆j. This is illustrated in equation (2.11) where we consider each subject to
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be independent. If ∆j = 1 (infection occurs), then the likelihood is calculated from
the probability of infection at time, Tj, given by the density function f(Tj). If ∆j = 0
(no infection or censoring), then the likelihood is calculated from the probability of
survival up to time, Tj. To estimate parameters, we propose a maximum likelihood










By taking the negative log of the likelihood and substituting in equation (2.10),










P (T, {di}nji=1)dt−∆jlogλ(Tj) (2.12)
When evaluating time-dependent dose-response data, finding exact times of in-
fection will generally be difficult if not impossible. We may know a time interval in
which the process of infection began but not an exact time. For these scenarios we can
adjust the likelihood formulation such that interval censoring can be incorporated.
This adjustment is discussed in detail in the appendix, section A.3.
2.3.6 Case study: inhalational anthrax data
Inhalation anthrax mortality data in monkeys were published by Brachman et al.
[55] from an observational animal study conducted in a wool sorting mill in South
Carolina in 1966. Cynomogus monkeys were placed in a laboratory trailer and air was
ventilated into the trailer from the wool sorting mill. Air was periodically sampled to
measure the anthrax concentration. A daily inhaled dose was estimated using these
data and an estimated monkey respiration rate. We considered these inhaled spores
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as pathogens capable of initiating infection.
The experiment was conducted during five distinct time intervals and three of
these were reported. During the third and fourth runs, the monkeys were continuously
exposed to contaminated air during working hours. Air was intermittently sampled
daily. These were the only two runs we were able to use to evaluate our model. As
air was ventilated in from the wool sorting mill, exposure was based on the natural
concentrations in the mill and therefore was not controlled by the researchers. For
our purposes, dose levels were estimated from figures provided in the paper in which
a single total daily exposure was recorded. We assumed that on days when exposures
were recorded that single equivalent sized inoculation occurred at the beginning of
each hour for the entire day. Monkeys health was monitored over the exposure period
and for a brief time after the terminal exposure. The experimenters checked in on the
monkeys three times per day. Autopsies were conducted immediately after a death
was discovered. Deaths due to non-anthrax causes also occurred and were recorded.
All monkeys were sacrificed shortly after the exposure period to determine anthrax
infection status.
During the third run, 32 monkeys were exposed for 47 days during which time 10
deaths due to anthrax infection were recorded. On the 50th day, all the remaining live
monkeys were sacrificed. At this time, two more monkeys were found to be infected
bringing the infection total to 12 with observed risk to be 44%. During the fourth
run, 31 monkeys were exposed for 41 days during which time 10 deaths due to anthrax
infection were recorded. The remaining live monkeys were sacrificed on the 51st day.
No additional monkeys were found to be infected and the observed risk was thus 23%.
Figure 2.3 is a graphical depiction of these data.
By the end of the study, monkeys had become infected, died of other causes, or
survived (did not become infected) over the duration of exposure. Survived subjects






Exposure (left axis and represented by lighter bars with width of 1 day)
and mortality (right axis and represented by black thin bars) results from
the third and fourth runs of the anthrax dataset. Exposure is assumed to
be given uniformly once every hour on days when exposures were recorded.
In the third run, 12/32 monkeys died from anthrax, and in the fourth run,
10/31 monkeys died from anthrax.
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censoring. We assume that autopsies that were negative for anthrax are conclusive in
that subjects would never have become infected. That is, we assume all non-infected
sacrificed monkeys survived the entire dose course. We also assume that anthrax has
a case-fatality rate of 100% in monkeys (i.e., no monkey survived infection). A small
set of subjects in these data died of causes not related to anthrax. We assume these
censored subjects died from reasons that were completely random and unrelated to
anthrax exposure and therefore evaluate their survival up to their final observed time,
Tj. For subjects who were infected, only day of death was observed.
Since we were interested only in time to infection take-off, we considered a fixed
population lag period, τ , which is the time between infection take-off (when the
course of ongoing infection is assured to be progressive) and time of death. Given the
observed time of death, Tj, the predicted time to infection is Tj − τ . We do not aim
to dynamically model any processes during the lag time, τ , and thus treated it as a
constant parameter. A previous study [56] showed that time between symptoms and
death is on the scale of several hours for Cynomologus monkeys so we do not think
symptom onset would aid in finding the total lag period.
This lag period, τ , was treated as a population parameter but it is likely individu-
ally probabilistic in nature. Based on the Vasconcelos study that this lag is variable, a
variety of τ values were initially implemented. However, the Vasconcelos experiments
used significantly higher dosing in bolus (the ID50) and potentially a different strain
of the Bacillus anthracis, and therefore lag times may not be comparable. Further,
an experiment on several other pathogens showed relatively invariant latency periods
for inoculations less than the ID50 [57].
To come up with a lag time estimates, we considered a previous study [58] that
used lag time distributions with median lag times of 1-3 days. However, their lag
period described the period from spore germination to symptoms. Anthrax infection
occurs after germination in macrophages [40, 59]. The biology and persistence of
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spores from time of exposure to infection is not well understood, but elimination of
spores is mediated by epithelial cells and macrophages [60]. While epithelial cells are
capable of eliminating anthrax spores alone[60], spores are also readily phagocytized
by alveolar macrophages where they germinate. While, the macrophage is capable
of eliminating the bacillus, B. anthracis toxins and defense mechanisms inhibit this
ability as it attempts to use the macrophage to reach the regional lymph system where
it can initiate infection as an extracellular pathogen [59]. This process implies that
germination is an important step in the infection process but that it occurs before
infection takes off. We therefore expect the lag period described in our model to be
less than that described in Brookmeyer et al.[58] and used a period from 1 to 4 days.
Treating τ as a nuisance parameter, we fixed it to a discrete uniform distribution;
it was then integrated out of the likelihood using conditional expectation. Further
discussion can be found in the appendix, section A.3.
Model fitting was done by profiling over α while optimizing the parameters s and
γ (in unit per hours) to minimize the negative log likelihood based on the Brachman
experimental data for run 3 and run 4. By profiling over a fixed α, we are also
analyzing these data under different assumptions concerning accumulation of doses
in terms of differing dose timing. Inference was done by fitting a spline curve through
the values of the negative log likelihood for each value creating a smooth depiction of
the log likelihood space. Using the minimum value of the spline (the overall maximum
likelihood estimate (MLE) fit), we defined a critical cut-off using the likelihood ratio
test [61]. That is, at the 95% significance level, the confidence interval of α falls in
the range of the minimum log likelihood ±1
2
× χ2(0.95, d.f.=1).
To evaluate consistency of our model with some past anthrax models, we calcu-
lated risks over a range of single dose values. This can be done for α = 1, reducing
our model to an exponential model, in which the exponential risk parameter k is
equivalent to the ratio of s over γ. For parameterizations involving α < 1 in which
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dose-timing patterns impact risk and the exponential model is no longer valid, our
model is only comparable to past models under single inoculation scenarios. Risks
for range of single dose values were calculated using equations (2.6) and (2.9).
Integrals were estimated using the adaptive Simpson quadrature method in MAT-
LAB. Optimization was done using minimax search algorithm in MATLAB. Spline
fitting was done using the default spline function in MATLAB.
2.3.7 Dosing experiment design
To explore the models ability to discern between different exposure patterns and
to illustrate the results from the Brachman data optimization, exposure patterns were
created representing two extremes; one large bolus and one evenly distributed set of
smaller inoculations given once daily over 15 days. The sum of the inoculations is
equivalent for both patterns at a value of 15,000 as it corresponds to the sum of the
total dose in run 3. Using the parameter MLEs from the model, risks were calculated
for each dosing pattern for a fixed α and corresponding MLE γ and s values. The
varying values of α illustrate potential expected results from an animal experiment
that incorporated dose timing.
2.4 Results
Figure 2.4 shows the results of the optimization profile over α using data from
the Brachman inhalational anthrax study runs 3 and 4. The likelihood space is a
fairly smooth decreasing curve in the optimized log likelihood space over as seen in
figure 2.4a. A smoothed spline was fit through the points and the 95% lower limit
was connected to the upper boundary of by a horizontal line. The optimal parameter
fit occurred when α̂=0.90 with respective MLE values for ŝ and γ̂ at 1.81×10−7/h
and 0.0097/h. For these overall MLE fits, the predicted risk for run 3 and run 4 is
50% and 16% compared to the observed attack rates of 44% and 23%, respectively.
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The 95% CI for α was (0.51, 1) where 1 is a bound due to our imposed constraints
on values of α. It is mathematically and statistically possible to extend α beyond
our imposed upper limit constraint but the biological interpretation of our model
becomes less intuitive. For α > 1, bolus exposures patterns have lower risks than
evenly distributed exposure patterns when total dose is fixed. Results for α > 1 are
discussed in the appendix, section A.4.
Plotting of the MLE ŝ and γ̂ values over the significant region of α can be seen in
figure 2.4b,c. The MLE values of γ are log linearly correlated with α. Recall that the
shape and rate of within host pathogen decay depends on both these parameters and,
therefore, this relationship is not unexpected as the optimization is trying to find a
relatively stable clearance curve and there are likely many sets of α and γ that could
elicit such a curve. When given multiple exposure patterns of the same total dose,
we would expect the α parameter to determine the importance of dose timing effects,
i.e., whether the risk will differ between these exposure patterns. Therefore, without
data containing more exposure patterns, it is difficult to independently estimate both
α and γ. The MLE values of s are relatively insensitive for changing values of α. The
data thus provide us with a consistent estimate of the instantaneous per pathogen
infectivity parameter, s, for a given clearance pattern.
The attack rates for varying single doses were calculated using our MLE param-
eterization and equations (2.6) and (2.9). We compare our MLE results to another
parameterization of our model and two previously analyzed anthrax dose-response
models by creating a risk curve over a large range of bolus dose values, all illustrated
in Figure 2.5. We consider results for α = 1, equating this parameterization of our
model to the exponential model where k = s/γ = 3.95× 10−5. The other two models
were a previous analysis of the Brachman data assuming each day was an indepen-
dent trial using an exponential dose-response model [62] and a separate analysis of
anthrax infection in Rhesus monkeys, specifically developed to model anthrax clear-
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Figure 2.4:
Results from the Brachman inhalational anthrax data analysis. A.) Re-
sults from optimization profile over α. A spline curve was fit to deter-
mine the minimum negative log likelihood (maximum likelihood estimate
(MLE) α̂ = 0.90) and to determine the 95% confidence interval (CI) (0.51,
1) using the log likelihood ratio test. B.) Optimized s values for values
of α within its 95% CI. C) Optimized log(γ) values for values of α within
its 95% CI. The minimum γ value in this range is 0.0046 h−1 and the
maximum is 0.17 h−1. D) Predicted risks for two exposure patterns using
MLE values profiled over α. Two exposure scenarios were used, one bolus
(circles) and one evenly distributed (crosses) exposure pattern, both with
the same total dose of 15,000. Parameter sets used for these calculations
were (α=0.50, s=1.65 ×10−7h−1, γ=0.20 h−1); (α=0.60, s=1.72×10−7
h−1, γ=0.093 h−1); (α=0.70, s=1.76×10−7h−1,γ=0.044 h−1); (α=0.80,
s=1.78×10−7h−1, γ=0.021 h−1); (α=0.90, s=1.81×10−7h−1, γ=0.0097
h−1); and (α=1.00, s=1.84×10−7h−1, γ= 0.0046 h−1).
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Brachman Results (Haas 2002)
(Brookmeyer et. al 2005)
Figure 2.5:
Comparison of our best fit results with other anthrax models when mod-
eling risk for a single bolus dose. To calculate this risk when α = 0.9,
equations (2.6) and (2.9) were used in combination with MLE values,
ŝ=1.81×10−7h−1 and γ̂=0.001h−1 (solid line). When α = 1, our model is
equivalent to an exponential model with k = s/γ = 3.95 × 10−5 (dashed
line). Previous exponential modeling of Brachman data assuming each
day as an independent dosing event yielded k=2.4×10−5[62] (dash-dotted
line). A model of anthrax outbreak in Rhesus monkeys which included
clearance rate and hazard rate yielded an attack rate formula equivalent
to an exponential model with k=7.17×10−5[58] (dotted line).
ance rates[58]. This model is similar to our model when α = 1, and produced a
clearance rate and hazard rate of 0.0029/hr and 2.08×10−7/h.
Next, we calculated the corresponding risks for the exposure patterns given in
section 2.3.7. We chose the corresponding MLE parameter sets for several α values
ranging from 0.5 to 1. Figure 2.4d depicts the predicted risks over this α range,
comparing the bolus exposure to the evenly distributed exposure pattern. We can see
that as α approaches 1, the gap between the predicted risks decreases. The largest
gap presented occurs at α = 0.5 where the bolus exposure has a risk of 64% and the
distributed exposure has a risk of 59%. When α = 0.9, the bolus risk is 47% and the
distributed exposure has a risk of 46% indicating dose-timing effects that are small.
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2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Plausibility of our model as a dose-response model
Using a simple function that expresses cumulative dose dependence on the pathogen
elimination rate, we are able to realistically relax the assumption that the risk of each
pathogen dose is independent of the time of arrival of other pathogen doses. Further,
through a survival analysis, we have presented a method for analyzing dose-response
time series data of exposure and infection events. As a case study, we presented an
analysis of inhalational anthrax infection in Cynomologus monkeys in an industrial
setting [55]. Our optimization found the best fitting parameters for these data as
follows: α=0.9, γ=0.0097/hr, and s = 1.81× 10−7/h. This result indicates that there
are very slight dose-timing effects, as indicated by the risk difference of 1% from the
simulated exposure experiments. This result also appears dependent on our lag time
assumptions. The problem of non-identifiability between our clearance rate (γ) and
lag period (τ) requires us to make some assumptions about the overall distribution of
the lag period, a problem also found in a previous anthrax analysis[58], where they
optimized a convolution of a time to germination likelihood and an exponential lag
period. Our lag period describes a period beginning with infection takeoff, which oc-
curs sometime after germination within macrophages [59], and ending in death. The
point at which infection has taken off is not provided in the Brachman experiment
and thus we must rely on an assumed lag period. To test sensitivity to lag period
assumptions, we tried other distributions, such a larger range of lag period and a
truncated exponential. If all times were weighted equally or if there were heavier
weighting on longer lag periods (greater than 6 days), the MLE α̂ was estimated at 1.
However, a distribution that weights faster lag periods more (such as the exponential
with mean of about 2 days) resulted in MLE α̂ values between 0.9 and 1. While
lag periods may be less variable and slower for doses under the ID50[57], such as in
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this dataset, future anthrax modeling for larger doses may require careful distribution
selection consistent with experiments done with higher dose levels[56]. The fitted val-
ues of s and γ decrease slightly as the lag period decreases. This result implies that
our estimate of within host pathogen persistence and risk depends on our lag period
selection and therefore we may be incorrectly classifying periods where dose-timing
is important as the lag period.
Although our model is unique in its implementation of multiple doses, we can
compare it to other dose-response models when considering the risk from a single dose.
As illustrated in figure 2.5, our model produced consistent results with other anthrax
models. Particularly, the ID50 of all these models are all within an order of magnitude.
A review of several anthrax dose-response models[63] found that risk models that were
similar to exponential distributions were the most successful at modeling anthrax risk.
Our analysis is consistent with this result. To truly check consistency among other
analyses, however, requires more data and models implementing multiple dosing.
Our 95% CI of (0.51, 1) reflects imprecision in estimation of values. Our confi-
dence interval calculation is limited in this example as we implemented an artificial
upper bound on α that is biological instead of statistical. If we allow α values greater
than 1, we find this interval to extend as far as 1.48, as discussed in the appendix,
section A.4. If α > 1, we would have a paradigm where bolus exposures have lower
risks than smaller, distributed exposures of the same total dose.
The strong functional relationship of α and γ implies that they should not be
estimated independently. Particularly, they share a decreasing log linear relationship
(figure 2.4c), showing that γ values decrease when α values increase. That is, when
clearance decreases in speed, the shape of the clearance curve becomes more curvilin-
ear. This illustrates a range of potential clearance curves that describe the pathogen
decay. The s parameter then provides us with an instantaneous per pathogen infec-
tion risk over the clearance time. When estimating the parameters for our model,
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we suggest a profile optimization over α. Using this approach, inference can then be
done to determine if α differs from 1 which would imply that risk estimation depends
on dose-timing. When using the model to estimate exposure risks or infection timing,
we assign the appropriately fitted γ value to a specified α value.
One limitation of our model due to its simplicity is the use of abstract parameters.
The α and s parameters are not readily biologically interpretable from the results and
the parameter γ is only interpretable in the special case of exponential clearance. We
can still present expected clearance curves and describe expected behavior of the
system with known parameters. For example, if we know we do not have exponential
clearance (α < 1), then bolus exposures correspond to the highest risk of infection.
However, given two different pathogens with this property (α < 1) but different
α values, it is not clear what the differing values of α tell us specifically about each
pathogen, especially if the other parameters vary also. Furthermore, extrapolating our
results to human populations requires additional assumptions. For traditional dose-
response experiments, we would need susceptibility of the host animal to be similar
to humans. Additionally, for our model, we would also need the surrogates immune
response to occur at a similar rate with similar effectiveness to the human population.
Cynomolgus monkeys and humans have similar anthrax infection pathology[56] which
implies that we may expect the dynamics and risk assessments to be similar given
these exposure patterns, however, it is not clear how the parameter sets might differ.
Another limitation of our model is that it does not take into account the re-
production of pathogens within host tissue, i.e., we only model pathogen clearance
as a decreasing curve between inoculations. Ideally, a model of the infection pro-
cess includes pathogen elimination by the immune system and the growth of the
pathogen within the host. The persistence of pathogen would then be more realis-
tically described as a stochastic process, with spikes both increasing and decreasing
over clearance until either the pathogen level reaches zero or begins to reproduce to an
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unbounded level, as presented in a previous model[10]. This model, however, requires
additional parameters and is computationally intensive which makes its implementa-
tion into complex models of environmental infection transmission systems difficult.
By ignoring pathogen growth during innate clearance but before the infection takes
off, the overall shape of pathogen decrease described by our model will be different
than the more realistic model that takes into account both processes. However, by
relaxing the assumption that infection risk must be time-independent, our model is
a step forward in dose-response risk assessment.
2.5.2 Experiments to inform time-dependent dose-response models
Our proposed exposure patterns illustrate simple experimental structures that
would elicit varying risk due to dose-timing effects. It is important to note that our
model is only one potential realization of time-dependence in dose-response models.
Conducting the proposed experiments and observing a significant risk difference be-
tween exposure patterns might be enough to imply that risk depends on dose-timing.
This discovery alone would illustrate how characterizing the risk of different routes
of transmission is critical, and further, would have important ramifications on inter-
vention policies.
To conduct such a time-dependent dose-response experiment, preliminary exper-
iments would need to be conducted to find a viable dose; that is, doses that do not
have risks near 0% or 100%. Further, these preliminary experiments need to give
insight into the time scale of interest. We used doses spaced by days since our results
pointed to clearance rates on the scale of days. For a pathogen like the influenza virus,
we may expect dose timing effects to be on a shorter time scale. After preliminary
experiments, dosing schemes similar to our proposed patterns should be implemented
with fixed total doses. By using exposure patterns that differ so widely, we are better
able to evaluate the impact of dose timing on the effectiveness of the immune sys-
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tem. Simply observing varying risk by exposure pattern can provide enough insight
to imply that risk depends on dose-timing. Simple analysis on differing risks would
be sufficient to show dose-timing effects. One shortfall of these experiments is that
they would likely require large subject sizes unless there are substantial dose timing
effects. If we look at the predicted risks of our exposure patterns from our analysis
when α=0.5, we would need 1550 subjects per pattern to find a statistically signif-
icant difference at the 0.05 level with 80% power using Fishers 2-sided exact test.
Naturally, if there are stronger dose timing effects (risks differences are much higher),
the necessary sample size drops. Other options would include designing experiments
that are mechanistically specific to the pathogens of interest and monitoring the cor-
responding immune response. For anthrax, we may design an experiment monitoring
macrophage loads over different dosing patterns and then analyzing the data with
an anthrax-specific mechanistic model. This scenario would reduce the emphasis on
elucidating risk differences and therefore may not require such large sample sizes.
By using a sufficient number of subjects, the time to infection distribution and
overall risk would be stabilized for each dosing course and thus provide stable data to
estimate our parameters. Further, using varying total doses is an additional method
to introduce precision to parameter estimation in our model. There were many lim-
itations in using the Brachman data to estimate our model parameters. The data
had small sample size and only two exposure patterns. Furthermore, the exposure
patterns are roughly similar for each run and the total doses differ. The estimation
of α depends on the effect of dose-timing and thus would be best estimated by widely
varying exposure patterns of fixed total dose.
2.5.3 Time-dependence in the dose-response model paradigm
Through the use of our model, we have shown that exposure timing can be used in
the calculation of risk and estimation of infection times. This is a distinct advantage
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over the risk calculation of classical dose-response models. In transmission systems,
different routes of transmission lead to varying types of exposure patterns. We can
now relax the assumption that the risk is invariant to different dose timing and thus
varying exposure patterns. Even if our model predicts invariant risks to exposure
patterns (exponential clearance), it allows us to estimate when infections would occur
over an exposure course. Fundamentally, we are interested in whether dose-timing is
an important factor in the calculation of risk. Our analysis shows that for anthrax,
there may not be these effects on the time scale we examined, i.e., the accumulation
of inoculations is an independent process with respect to immune clearance when
time intervals are one day at the minimum. There might be such time dependence
across shorter times. Despite these findings, we still provide a reasonable estimate
for the persistence of the pathogen in the host on the scale of days. We expect
that the importance of dose-timing would be dependent on the infection process of
a given pathogen. For other pathogens, such as non-respiratory bacteria or viruses,
we may not expect these properties to remain constant, especially if the immune
mechanisms of clearance differ biologically. For example, the B. anthracis bacillus
uses macrophages as a transport to the lymph system in the course of the infection
process [40]. This is a unique mode of infection that affects both immune effectiveness
and clearance time scale that differs from infection processes of many other pathogens,
e.g., the influenza virus.
Infectious disease transmission systems are time-dependent processes generally
involving many different types of environmental exposure routes. In influenza trans-
mission, the virus can be transmitted in the air, through direct contact, and through
fomite surfaces [64]. In anthrax bioterrorism scenarios, we may wish to consider the
risks of large release versus a small steady release of spores. For an enteric disease, like
cholera, norovirus, or pathogenic E. coli, competing routes such as contaminated food
or water contribute to varying exposure patterns. Each of these transmission routes
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could be characterized by distinct exposure patterns such as evenly distributed, small
exposures (e.g., breathing dispersed pathogen in air) or a large bolus exposure (e.g.,
consuming a contaminated glass of water). Modeling these routes requires many
assumptions, particularly when time-independent dose-response models are imple-
mented to give a risk calculation for a given exposure pattern. If exposures occur in
a time frame in which the immune system has begun to respond but has not cleared
the pathogen, we may no longer have independent pathogen risk calculations. In this
scenario, distinct exposure routes may elicit differing risk properties. To see these
properties, dose-timing effects must be considered in dose-response experiments, such
as we suggest, elucidating the time scale of clearance and the potential importance to
risk calculations. We aim to develop a dose-response paradigm that readily includes
time-dependence in both risk and infection time calculations.
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CHAPTER III
Successes and shortcomings of polio eradication: A
transmission modeling analysis
3.1 Abstract
Polio eradication is on the cusp of success with only a few regions still main-
taining transmission. Improving our understanding of why some regions have been
successful and others have not will help both with global eradication of polio and with
development of more effective vaccination strategies for other pathogens. To examine
past eradication efforts we constructed a transmission model for wild poliovirus in-
corporating waning immunity affecting both infection risk and transmissibility of any
resulting infection, age-mediated vaccination rates, and transmission of OPV. The
model produces results consistent with the four country categories defined by the
Global Polio Eradication Program: elimination with no subsequent outbreaks; elim-
ination with subsequent transient outbreaks; elimination with detected transmission
for more than 12 months; and endemic polio transmission. Analysis of waning immu-
nity rates and OPV transmissibility reveals that higher waning immunity rates make
eradication harder due to increasing numbers of infectious adults and higher OPV
transmission rates make eradication easier as adults become re-immunized. Given
these dynamic properties, attention should be given to intervention strategies that
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complement childhood vaccination. For example, improvement in sanitation can re-
duce the reproduction number in problematic regions, while adult vaccination can
lower adult transmission.
3.2 Introduction
The use of vaccines is a major success story in the field of public health. On the
verge of global eradication of polio, eliminating polio from the remaining few countries
has proven difficult. Local elimination efforts have focused on both fine-tuning vaccine
design and developing strategies to attain intensive coverage of children. Here we
review the history of polio eradication through the lens of transmission system theory.
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative has classified countries into four categories
based on their elimination success [45]. Countries in Category A have had successful
elimination with no subsequent outbreaks. This is the largest group including, by con-
tinent, the Americas, Australia, Western Europe, and large portions of both Africa
and Asia. India, after continual eradication difficulty, has been recently classified into
Category A. Countries classified as Category B have documented successful elimina-
tion with subsequent transient outbreaks. These countries are African countries near
Nigeria, and Euro-Asian nations near India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Countries
classified as Category C, Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Su-
dan, have had documented successful elimination followed by subsequent outbreaks
and transmission detected for more than 12 months after the first subsequent out-
break [45]. The last group of countries, comprising Category D, has endemic polio
transmission. These countries are Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan. We undertake
here a dynamic systems analysis that helps explain how countries got into these differ-
ent categories and what determines how they move between these different categories.
Poliomyelitis is a disease caused by the poliovirus that is characterized by acute
flaccid paralysis. Poliovirus is transmitted fecal-orally and primarily causes gastroin-
53
testinal infection with minor or no symptoms. These infected individuals excrete
virus into the environment where poor sanitation and high population density allows
the virus to persist and transmit.
While polio immunity against paralysis does not wane substantially, immunity
affecting susceptibility to infection and contagiousness does. Evidence of increasing
susceptibility with waning immunity comes from antibody patterns [12, 13, 47, 66–76]
and the relationships between antibody levels and protection against infection [77, 78].
Evidence of increasing contagiousness with waning immunity comes from: 1) an oral
polio vaccine OPV challenge study demonstrating that individuals with prior wild po-
lio virus WPV infection 40-50 years earlier excrete as much virus as completely suscep-
tible individuals [12]; 2) an OPV challenge study in elderly populations demonstrating
the association of excretion among previously vaccinated adults with antibody lev-
els [79]; and 3) recently immunized children that excreted significant quantities of
WPV [49, 80].
The two types of vaccines in use are the live virus OPV and the IPV. Both vaccine
types provide immunity to paralysis [18] but OPV provides higher protection against
infection and greater reductions in excretion during infection [14, 48, 49]. As a live
virus, OPV is transmissible through the same routes as wild poliovirus and thus has
added effects of reaching unvaccinated populations and boosting immunity in those
previously infected or vaccinated. Unfortunately, mutated derivatives of circulating
OPV can also cause paralytic disease [18]. Consequently, cessation of OPV is an
important final step in eradication.
Though elimination in some countries with good sanitation has been achieved
using an early childhood routine vaccination schedule, the national level elimination
programs in other countries involve supplementary immunization activities (SIAs)
reaching all children 5 and under on national immunization days.
The regions where polio elimination has been most difficult are heterogeneous in
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terms of population size, density, sanitation, and vaccination coverage. For example,
in northern India, which has very dense and extensive populations with poor sanita-
tion, successful elimination required more than 15 SIAs per year in some areas. In
contrast, a 2010 outbreak in the Congo occurred under conditions of low population
density and low exposure to poor sanitation, but low vaccination coverage in a subset
of the population [45].
To better understand what determines success or failure under these diverse con-
ditions, we examine a dynamic model across a diversity of transmission conditions,
vaccination levels, vaccine effects and vaccine transmissibility. Our model does not
aim to capture any specific country scenario but rather describe the general phenom-
ena of polio elimination.
3.3 Methods
The structure for our transmission model is shown in figure 3.1. Appendix B
contains a detailed background of the development and structure of our model. We
constructed a deterministic, compartmental model that included different levels of
immune status between the recovered state and the fully susceptible state. These
are seen model equations (B.2)–(B.5) in section B.2. We included separate infection
compartments for WPV and OPV, assuming no concurrent infection, as shown in
equations (B.7). OPV transmission was modeled relative to wild polio transmission
using parameters that reduced contagiousness and duration of infection while main-
taining the same susceptibility as WPV, as shown in equations (B.1) and (B.7)).
Model parameters are described in table 3.1 (and in more detail in table B.1). Age
compartments allowed for age-specific vital dynamics and vaccination programs that
target children. Aging was modeled as a pure delay process consistent with past ag-
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Graphical depiction of the transmission model without aging or vital dy-
namics (for details on vital dynamic implementation, see appendix B.3).
The I compartments correspond to the wild poliovirus (WPV) infected
population and the V compartments correspond to the oral polio vaccine
(OPV) infected population. Each set of S, I, and V compartments are
further broken down based on immunity stage, i, with n total immune
stages. Individuals enter the population at rate, b, and have no immu-
nity. The Sn−1 state corresponds to full immunity and is achieved after
infection caused by either OPV or WPV. Waning of immunity occurs as
population transitions between Si compartments, at rate ωi, moving from
higher immunity to lower immunity. We assume that complete loss of
immunity is not possible. Levels of immunity are determined by immune
stage, i, and affect susceptibility, βi; contagiousness, θi; and recovery rate,
γi. Force of infection is the product of the effective contact rate (a fully
infectious contact given no immunity), c, and the linear combination of
the relative contagiousness, θi, of each infected subpopulation times its
density. Transmission of OPV is reduced compared to WPV by decreas-
ing the contagiousness by factor ε and increasing the recovery rate from
infection by factor κ. Infection due to OPV can also occur due to effective
vaccination rate, φ. The parameters are also explained in table 3.1 and
in greater detail in the appendix, section B.2.
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Table 3.1: Polio transmission model parameters
Model
Parameters Descriptions Values
i Immune stage 1...n
j Age group 1...m
n Total immune stages 10
m Total age groups 34
b Birth rate into population (yr−1) 0.025a
c Effective contact rate (yr−1) 40–200b
βi Relative susceptibility for immune stage, i 0–1
c,d
θi Relative contagiousness for immune stage, i 0–1
c,e
γi Relative recovery rate (yr
−1) for immune stage, i 10–40c,f
ωi Rate of immune stage change (yr
−1) 0, 0.2, or 2g
φj Effective vaccination rate (yr
−1) 0–3
ε Relative contagiousness OPVh:WPVh 0.15–0.45
κj Relative recovery rate OPVh:WPVh 2.25–6.25
µj Age-dependent death rates (yr
−1) i
aThe birth rate, b, was set in relation to the death rate, µj , so that the population size is constant.
bThe effective contact rate, c, was assigned using previously established R0 values [18],along with
our derived transmission model calculation of R0 (table 3.2).
cImmunity response to susceptibility, contagiousness, and duration of contagiousness were as-
signed across their ranges of values using an exponential function (see section B.4 for more details).
dThe immunity parameter for susceptibility, βi, attenuates the infectivity of an effective contact on
the susceptible population, where 1 defines no reduction (no immunity) and 0 defines no susceptibility
(full immunity).
eThe measure of contagiousness, θi, attenuates the force of infection due to the infected pop-
ulation, where 1 defines full contagiousness (no immunity) and 0 defines no contagiousness (full
immunity).
fThe recovery rate, γi, is defined according to observed ranges of shedding duration [14, 49].
gSee section B.4 and table B.1
hOral Polio Vaccine (OPV); Wild Polio Virus (WPV)
iSee section B.3
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Immunity reduces susceptibility to infection and also reduces contagiousness and
duration of infection if there is reinfection. As immunity wanes (modeled as an un-
derlying exponential process), susceptibility, contagiousness and duration of infection
increase. As depicted by the S0 compartment in figure 3.1, we assumed that individ-
uals never fully lose immunity; i.e., only new members of the population, introduced
at a fixed birthrate, were completely susceptible, shown in equations (B.2)–(B.3). In-
fection with WPV or OPV through either vaccination or OPV transmission resolves
into full immunity, a short lived period where there is no susceptibility to reinfec-
tion, shown in figure 3.1 using flows from the infected populations (compartments
I and V ) into the susceptible compartment with highest immunity, Sn−1. As time
since recovery increases (population flows across the S compartments in figure 3.1),
susceptibility to reinfection increases and subsequent reinfection has increasing con-
tagiousness and duration. After a reinfection, full immunity is regained. For more
detail on the modeling of waning immunity see supplementary material, section B.4.
Unless otherwise stated, we assumed that susceptibility wanes to 50% compared
to no immunity after 10 years. The immunity waning rates for contagiousness and
duration were set to be equal to one-fourth the waning rate of susceptibility. An
exploration of waning settings is shown in the appendix, section B.5.1. Initially, we
fixed OPV transmissibility to 5% of WPV transmissibility. This value for OPV rel-
ative transmission was selected using criteria from Fine and Carneiro [18] such that
circulating OPV, specifically for serotypes 1 and 3, would not sustain transmission.
We then investigated a broader range of OPV transmission, including higher trans-
missibility consistent with serotype 2. Further, we investigated the effect of waning
immunity by choosing values to examine the impact of waning on the dynamics for
wide-ranging outcomes. The model parameters we varied for our analysis are shown
in table 3.2.
To model vaccination we considered effective vaccination rates in contrast to actual
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Table 3.2: Model factors varied in the analysis
Analysis Variable Description Calculation Rangea
Maximum R0 Reproduction number in c/γ0 4–20[18]
an immunologically naive
population
OPVb transmissibility Transmissibility relative to
WPVb (%)
ε/κ 0–20[18]
Susceptiblity waning rate Exponential waning rates
(yr−1)c
0.04, 0.07, 0.1d,e
φj Effective vaccination rates
(yr−1) in children (0-5 year
olds)
0–3 [45, 48]
aUpper and lower bounds were selected as biologically plausible limits.
bOral Polio Vaccine (OPV); Wild Polio Virus (WPV)
cSee section B.4
dWaning rate values are not well defined and are, therefore, chosen to examine the impact of
waning on the dynamics for wide-ranging outcomes. Additional values are explored in sections B.5.1
and B.5.3
eThe susceptibility waning rates, 0.04, 0.07, and 0.1 per year correspond to losing 50% suscepti-
bility after 17, 10, and 7 years, respectively.
vaccination rates. An effective vaccination rate corresponds to vaccination resulting in
complete immunity. In reality, a dose of OPV may not induce an immune response and
multiple OPV vaccinations are required to achieve full immunity [48]. The effective
vaccination rate is thus less than the actual vaccination rate. Our major inferences
did not change when we changed the model such that vaccines result in partial but
increasing immunity from each vaccination. The pertinent analysis is presented in
supplementary material section B.5.2.
We simulated polio transmission initially without vaccination until the model
reached steady state dynamics. After achieving steady state, we introduced vacci-
nation into the population. The target effective vaccination rate was achieved over
an implementation time period where vaccine rates increased linearly from zero to
the target level. The main analysis used a 2-year implementation time. Results for
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10-year implementation are presented in supplementary material section B.5.3.
We numerically solved differential equations across a range of waning rates, rel-
ative oral polio vaccine transmissibility levels, effective vaccine rates, and the repro-
duction number, as shown in table 3.2. The reproduction number was calculated for
a fully susceptible population with no vaccination and is approximately equivalent to
the effective contact rate times the duration of infection. By monitoring prevalence
levels over the course of a vaccination program we identified parameter ranges that
correspond to difficulties in eradication across the countries described in table 3.3.
Modeling was conducted in Python using the SciPy module and figures were made
in R using the lattice package.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Explaining success in polio eradication efforts across country clas-
sifications
Figure 3.2 displays both short-term (3.2A) and long-term (3.2B) vaccination suc-
cess across differing levels of R0 and effective vaccination rates. We measured short-
term success as the minimum prevalence in the first 50 years, such that the lower
this minimum prevalence, the greater the short-term success. The ability to achieve
low prevalence at any given time does not imply long-term success. We therefore
measured long-term success as the final equilibrium prevalence. A low long-term
prevalence is an indicator of stable elimination. Countries classified as Category A,
based on the GPEI [45], generally have both short and long-term success. Countries
classified as Category B and C are those countries with fragile short-term success, i.e.,
they achieved short-term success but have conditions for non-zero final prevalence.
Category D countries have not achieved success in the short or long term.
The placement of countries onto figure 3.2 was based on country specific estimates
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Table 3.3:
Classification of countries in context of polio eradication initiative in 2012.
Country type Hygiene Examples Eradication R0
Statusa categoryb rangesa
Industrialized Good United States, Western
Europe, Australia, etc.
A 4
Industrialized Poor South America, Russia A 10




Developing Dense India A 14–18
& poor
Developing Poor Horn of Africa (e.g.,
Congo, Uganda)
B 8–12
Developing Poor Central Asia (e.g., Tajik-
istan, Turkmenistan)
B 10–14
Developing Poor Angola, Chad, Demo-
cratic Republic of the
Congo, and Sudan
C 8–12
Developing Poor Afghanistan, B 14–18
Nigeria, and Pakistan
aCountry type, hygiene status, and R0 values chosen from Fine & Carneiros polio transmission
review [18].
bCountry classification based on the Global Polio Eradication Initiative [45]. Category A corre-
sponds to countries that have achieved eradication; category B describes countries that have achieved
eradication but have transient epidemics; category C describes countries that have achieved eradica-
tion but have re-established transmission; and category D describes countries that have not achieved
elimination.
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A) The minimum prevalence reached in the first 50 years due to the ini-
tial vaccine implementation (a measure of short-term success) and B) the
final prevalence resulting from the vaccination program (a measure of
long-term success), across R0 and effective vaccination rates per year for
all children under 5. OPV transmissibility is set to 5% of WPV trans-
missibility. Waning rates are set such that it takes 10 years to reduce
susceptibility by 50%. The circle represents the United States, the aster-
isk represents regions of India (Uttar Pradesh and Bihar), and the dia-
mond represents Xinjiang, China. The dashed rectangular box represents
China and the solid rectangular box represents the endemic countries:
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Values for R0 and effective vacci-
nation rates were selected qualitatively and are discussed in the section
3.4.1. Divergence in prevalence levels between A) and B) does not neces-
sarily predict future outbreaks or endemicity but indicate potential fragile
short-term eliminations.
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for R0 and vaccination rates. R0 values were selected using data from Fine & Carneiro
[18]. We crudely selected effective vaccination rates for categories and countries using
the Global Polio Eradication Initiative criteria [45] by considering enhancing factors
such as SIAs deployment and mitigating factors such as poor coverage or take-rates.
Category A countries comprise diverse conditions but generally have lower transmis-
sion conditions with adequate vaccination coverage. The United States is shown on
figure 3.2 with a small, stable R0 due to its low transmission conditions and a 100%
vaccination rate to illustrate a consistent, effective vaccination program. In contrast,
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh of India are presented in figure 3.2 as having very high
transmission conditions and very high vaccination levels. The yearly vaccination rate
of 2.5 was selected to represent full coverage plus at least one fully effective booster.
With a recent outbreak in Xinjiang, China is an example of how Category B
and C conditions emerge from Category A countries. China is large nation with
varying transmission conditions so we selected a range of R0 values for figure 3.2
consistent with those presented for both types of industrialized nations in table 3.3.
The outbreak in Xinjiang has been attributed to importation and falling vaccination
rates [46] so we illustrate potential effective vaccination rates ranging from enhanced
(greater than 1) to reduced (less than 1). While the 2011 outbreak was an isolated
incident in China, its placement in figure 3.2 demonstrates that other Category A
nations with a higher R0 or lower vaccination coverage may be at increased risk to
emerge as Category B or C countries due to importation.
The category D countries (Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan) are depicted with
moderate transmission levels but poor coverage, consistent with the difficulty pro-
grams have had in adequately vaccinating their remaining endemic regions. Afghanistan
and Pakistan are grouped together due to their linked transmission conditions through
importation [45].
In figure 3.2A, the short-term success of the vaccination program show decreasing
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prevalence as vaccination increases for a given R0. For low values of R0, low minimum
prevalence levels (figure 3.2A) correspond to low final prevalence levels (figure 3.2B)
suggesting stable elimination under these conditions. However, at higher levels of R0
where we still see low minimum prevalence levels, we no longer see low long-term
prevalence suggesting that the initial drop in prevalence due to vaccination is not
maintained and the probability of resurgence is increased. A further exploration of
model dynamics associated with the rebound epidemics is presented in the appendix
B.5.4.
To better understand what causes the increasing divergence between figure 3.2A
and 3.2B at increasing levels of R0, we need to consider waning immunity and reinfec-
tion dynamics, where reinfection is defined as WPV infection that occurs after a first
infection caused by WPV transmission, OPV transmission, or OPV vaccination [15].
At high R0, when vaccination is implemented, the combination of vaccine effective-
ness and immunity boosting through reinfection causes an immediate sharp decrease
in prevalence. However, if the vaccine levels are not high enough to push prevalence
to zero, the waning of immunity eventually increases the number of susceptible indi-
viduals providing a means for virus circulation through reinfection epidemics. On the
other hand, when R0 is low, the prevalence reduction after vaccination implementa-
tion is not highly dependent on immune boosting through reinfection. Therefore, for
low levels of R0, vaccination levels of children do not have to reach very high levels
in order to get below the population threshold for transmission illustrated in figure
3.2B.
3.4.2 Role of OPV transmission
Increasing OPV transmission from 2.5 to 20% of WPV results in a large reduction
in the vaccination rates required to reach low or zero prevalence at equilibrium (figure
3.3). The reduction in required vaccination levels is particularly evident for high R0
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levels. These increased levels of OPV transmission correspond to serotype 2 vaccina-
tion which is known to be much more transmissible than the serotypes 1 and 3 [18].
At high levels of vaccine transmission, immunity is boosted in those previously in-
fected reducing the overall transmission potential. Results for reducing relative OPV
transmission to 0% are shown in the appendix B.5.5.
3.4.3 Role of waning immunity
Figure 3.4 illustrates final prevalence for faster and slower waning immunity rates.
If waning immunity is slow, for example, it takes 17 years to reach 50% susceptibil-
ity (left half of figure 3.4), reaching elimination prevalence levels requires much less
vaccination coverage than if waning is faster, for example, it takes 10 (figure 3.3) or
7 years to reach 50% susceptibility (right half of figure 3.4) for given levels of R0.
Further, by exploring across OPV transmissibility levels for each of these waning lev-
els, we observe the importance of the boosting that occurs from OPV transmission.
Even when immunity waning is fast, if relative OPV transmission is 20% that of
WPV transmission, eradication is still achievable at an R0 of 20 for effective vacci-
nation rates around 3 per year or higher. Since waning immunity can significantly
reduce the long-term efficacy of vaccination, this analysis highlights a range where it
is important to understand these underlying dynamics.
3.4.4 Reinfection contributions to transmission at endemic equilibrium
Figure 3.5 illustrates the proportion of the force of infection attributable to re-
infection across varying levels of reproduction numbers and vaccination rates. Rein-
fections are infections of WPV that occur after previous infection due to an earlier
WPV infection, OPV infection, or vaccination. For lower levels of OPV transmissibil-
ity when vaccination levels are greater than 1 per year and elimination is not reached,
the proportion of the force of infection that are due to reinfections rises above 50%.
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Final prevalence across vaccination rate and R0 where oral polio vaccine
(OPV) transmissibility relative to wild poliovirus (WPV) transmissibility
is set to A) 2.5%, B) 10%, and C) 20% of OPV transmissibility. Waning
rates are set such that it takes 10 years to reduce susceptibility by 50%,
contagiousness of any resulting infection by 16% and duration of any











































































































































































Final prevalence across vaccination and R0 where by column, waning rates
increase from slow (A, B, C: it takes 17 years to reach 50% susceptibility)
to fast (D, E, F: it takes 7 years to reach 50% susceptibility); and by
row, oral polio vaccine (OPV) transmissibility relative to wild poliovirus
(WPV) transmissibility increases from 2.5% (A, D) to 10% (B, E) to 20%
(C, F).
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When relative OPV transmissibility reaches 20%, elimination occurs under conditions
where at lower OPV transmissibility levels transmission was dominated by reinfec-
tion. OPV transmission prevents immunity from waning to the level where reinfection
transmission is important. Specifically, in conjunction with figures 3.2 and 3.3, we
can conclude that the final prevalence under high transmission conditions and high
vaccination rates was maintained by reinfection transmission from aging populations
experiencing waning immunity. This illustrates the importance of boosting immunity
in populations with waned immunity.
3.5 Discussion
Global polio eradication is in its final stages. To ensure success, intensive efforts
are needed in the few remaining countries. The analyses we have presented help
demonstrate how reproduction numbers, transmissibility of OPV, immunity waning
rates, and vaccination rates contribute to successes and failures. While our analytic
approach cannot describe or predict the specific course of any nations elimination
effort, it does help illustrate dynamics that should affect control decisions. Most
importantly it reveals the fragility of elimination in high R0 areas, how reinfection
contributes to that fragility, and how high levels of OPV transmission counteract the
fragility related to reinfection potential.
Worldwide eradication success has been achieved by targeting children. In coun-
tries with high levels of sanitation, the success was swift. In nations with poor
sanitation, such as Egypt, India, and Bangladesh, success has been less swift, but
has been possible. Supplementary immunization activities SIAs on national immu-
nization days have been important for success under these more difficult conditions.
SIAs revaccinate children many more times than routine immunization would. Since
revaccinated children can excrete vaccine poliovirus [80], the resulting OPV trans-
mission boosts immunity in unvaccinated children and in individuals whose waning
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Depiction of proportion of the force of infection that are due to rein-
fections across vaccination rate and R0 where oral polio vaccine (OPV)
transmissibility relative to wild poliovirus (WPV) transmissibility is set
to A) 2.5%, B) 5%, C) 10% and D) 20%. Reinfection is defined as WPV
infection that occurs after an initial infection caused by an earlier WPV
infection, vaccination, or infection due to OPV transmission. Waning
rates are set such that it takes 10 years to reduce susceptibility by 50%,
contagiousness of any resulting infection by 16% and duration of any re-
sulting infection by 16%. In the white areas of the graph, there is not
sustained transmission to calculate the force of infection (i.e., prevalence
equals zero).
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immunity might otherwise bring them to a state where they could be infected by and
transmit WPV.
When OPV is highly transmissible, low levels of prevalence can be achieved in
high transmission conditions with less than extreme vaccination coverage; this is true
even for faster waning immunity and higher R0. At high transmission (R0) levels in
figure 3.2B, the low levels of prevalence induced by the initial vaccine implementation
have rebounded into considerably higher endemic equilibrium levels that are not ob-
served when OPV transmissibility is high (figure 3.3C). When OPV transmissibility
is low, under endemic conditions of high vaccination and high transmission, the force
of infection is largely attributable to reinfection (figure 3.5). By increasing the trans-
missibility of the OPV strain, we eliminate transmission attributable to reinfection
by effectively boosting populations with waned immunity. That is, asymptomatic
adult populations with waned immunity may be important factors in transmission
and their impact can be reduced by re-contracting vaccine strain poliovirus.
The final stages of eradication for WPV serotype 1 and 3 can be characterized
by difficulties that did not affect the eradication of serotype 2. The increased effi-
cacy of tOPV for WPV serotype 2 is clearly one important factor [45] accounting
for the success in type 2 eradication, but our analysis illustrates that lower levels
of vaccine strain transmission contribute to the difficulties in achieving eradication.
When transmissibility of the vaccine strain is lower, as it is in poliovirus serotype
1 and 3 [18], vaccination strategies affecting the potential for reinfections to trans-
mit should be considered. Besides focused SIAs, another strategy might be to add
a single booster for adults in high transmission regions. Such a campaign would be
costly and potentially difficult to implement but could contribute to success in regions
where elimination remains in a fragile state. Furthermore, the importance of OPV
transmission highlights the care that must be taken when ceasing OPV vaccination
such as maintaining high quality surveillance. The potential for cVDPV needs to be
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minimized in the final stages of eradication. Since IPV has been shown to induce mu-
cosal immunity through boosting in previously OPV immunized populations [83, 84],
IPV might be a candidate vaccine for boosters in older populations that could reduce
cVDPV risks.
Our model of waning immunity uses a simple exponential process where OPV or
WPV vaccination always results in complete immunity. It is possible that altering
this assumption could affect our inferences about what is leading to success or failure
in eradication efforts. If immunization can result in incomplete immunity then SIAs
may experience success due to ensuring comprehensive coverage of under-immunized
children. Furthermore, the evidence of waning of immunity through decrease in an-
tibody levels, particularly in high transmission regions, could stem from nuances not
addressed in our analysis. These include factors known to affect polio immunization
such as malnutrition, concurrent enteric infections, and vaccine tolerance [83]. The
extent to which these factors play a role deserves to be analyzed in future dynamic
transmission system frameworks.
Because our model used a continuous, deterministic framework the continuous
population assumption allows our transmission system to reach trivially low preva-
lence levels temporarily. In reality, when prevalence reaches very low levels, de-
mographic stochasticity would lead to transmission cessation. Additionally, the de-
terministic nature of our model prevents us from modeling outbreaks in eliminated
regions due to sporadic importation, a topic previously analyzed [85]. Nonetheless,
our deterministic analysis shows how category A countries with high transmission
conditions are still at risk for epidemics due to re-introduction of virus; i.e, we can
discern problematic parameter regions where prevalence can reach very low levels due
to initial vaccine implementation but maintain long-term prevalence (figure 3.2).
The polio vaccine has been a public health triumph since its first implementation
over 50 years ago. Hoping to follow the success of the smallpox eradication program,
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the polio eradication program has eliminated polio in most of the world, removing a
terrible and debilitating disease from the memories of most living populations. With
a handful of remaining endemic countries on the cusp of eradication, we are on the
verge of a major public health victory. Our model highlights some of the potential
challenges that have prevented success in the final phase of polio elimination. We hope
that by better understanding the dynamics driving transmission we can improve the
design of future public health initiatives to eradicate infectious diseases.
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Migration and polio eradication
4.1 Abstract
Reaching polio eradication has been difficult in the remaining endemic nations:
Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Failure in these regions has been attributed to
both “vaccine failure” and “failure to vaccinate.” “Vaccine failure” corresponds to the
difficulty of oral polio vaccine to properly induce immunity in certain populations.
“Failure to vaccinate” describes conditions where vaccination implementation is poor.
Vaccine implementation has been an issue in these endemic nations where governance
has been poor, populations are mobile, and there is cultural aversion to vaccination.
We developed a polio transmission model incorporating waning immunity and trans-
mission of oral polio vaccine allowing for migration between populations. Through
migration, we allow transmission conditions and vaccination policies of one region
to affect vaccination effectiveness in another region. Our analysis demonstrated that
migration from populations with poor vaccination implementation can mitigate the
effectiveness of implementing vaccination campaigns and make reaching elimination
more difficult. Where India achieved success by targeting hard to reach mobile popula-
tions, the remaining endemic regions could achieve success invoking similar strategies.
Furthermore, success in these regions may be aided by complementary interventions
such as improvement in sanitary conditions or vaccinating older populations.
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4.2 Introduction
Persistent polio transmission in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria is the final
challenge of global eradication. The recent epidemics in Niger, Tajikistan, the Re-
public of Congo, and China, however, underscore the tenuous nature of elimination.
Polio importation and lapses in vaccination coverage can create susceptibility pockets
where outbreaks can flourish highlighting the need to establish successful vaccination
programs [46]. Two factors are critical for eradication: the biological efficacy of the
intervention and effective implementation. These factors have been characterized as
“vaccine failure” and “failure to vaccinate”, respectively [52, 87]. In this paper, we
explore how “failure to vaccinate” impedes polio elimination across regions through
migration.
“Vaccine failure” can occur in several contexts: 1) the vaccine attenuates disease
but not viral shedding, 2) the vaccine fails to induce immunity (i.e., low take-rates),
or 3) induced immunity wanes over time. Both IPV and OPV provide immunity to
paralysis but OPV induces higher protection against infection and greater reductions
in excretion during infection [14, 17, 48, 49]. Therefore, to reduce polio transmis-
sion, OPV is used in transmissive regions. Failure to induce and maintain immunity
is an important factor in polio eradication difficulty. Reduced take-rates have been
observed in highly transmissive regions due to a variety of factors (e.g., malnour-
ishment, competing enteric infection, poor immune response) [48, 83, 87]. Duration
of immunity is also limited where immunity to excretion induced by OPV has been
shown to wane over time [14, 79, 80].
In India, elimination difficulty was largely attributed to “vaccine failure” [52,
53, 87] because OPV take-rates were lower than expected in high transmission re-
gions [48, 83]. However, recent elimination in India shows success is possible under
these conditions. To overcome vaccine efficacy limitations, vaccination implemen-
tation efforts were ramped up substantially to focus on under-vaccinated children,
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undercovered villages, and hard to reach migratory populations [29]. The success of
this strategy demonstrates the importance of “failure to vaccinate.”
The concept of “failure to vaccinate” extends beyond the biological properties
of the vaccine. The inability to properly vaccinate populations depends on demo-
graphics, politics, culture, and governance [52]. Further, vaccination implementation
failure can occur at any population level ranging from villages to nations. Prior to
the change in campaign strategy in India, lower vaccination rates were observed in
rural migrants in northern India [30]. These mobile population were a major focus of
the successful campaign [29]. Through their success, India potentially demonstrates
the importance of vaccination implementation in undercovered subpopulations.
The remaining endemic nations of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria face a com-
bination of problems. Failure to achieve elimination in Pakistan and Nigeria has been
attributed to both “vaccine failure” in high transmission conditions [87] and “failure
to vaccinate” due to population aversion to vaccination [51, 52] and failure of gov-
ernance to adequately ensure vaccination [53]. While the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative made progress in Pakistan during 2012 [50], violence against health workers
has created volatile security situations potentially impeding progress [45]. Failure to
eliminate polio in Afghanistan has defied straightforward characterization. Recent
reviews of the current status of polio eradication attribute failure in the southern
region of Afghanistan to internal conflict and border migration with Pakistan [87].
However, Afghanistan has implemented a suitable vaccination program evidenced by
success in northern regions [46, 52, 53]. Thus, it remains unclear whether persistent
transmission in the southern regions can be attributed to higher transmission condi-
tions, poor vaccination coverage, low vaccine efficacy, immigration from Pakistan, or
some combination of these factors.
Migration is an important population feature of all of the remaining endemic re-
gions. Genetic evidence has shown consistent transmission between Afghanistan and
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Pakistan [54], where there is a long history of migration across a porous border [88].
Furthermore, Afghanistan and Pakistan have asynchronous vaccination campaigns
where Afghanistan has had mild success in northern regions [46, 52, 53] but Pakistan
has been inconsistent [46, 53] and recently plagued by violence against public health
officials [45]. Nigeria has high levels of combined immigration and emigration [89]
and is known to seed outbreaks in surrounding regions [45, 46]. Furthermore, these
mobile populations tend to have poor vaccination coverage [26].
We have previously developed a polio transmission model incorporating compo-
nents of “vaccine failure” through waning immunity in a single population framework
where “failure to vaccinate” described reduced vaccination rates [86]. We demon-
strated that achieving short-term success is possible even under high transmission
conditions through initial vaccination. However, reaching elimination in the short-
term may be the result of fragile stochastic die-out where long-term transmission
is possible. When vaccination lapses, outbreaks must be handled or prevented by
deploying mass vaccination campaigns requiring quality surveillance [85]. Migration
connects regional populations and thus may enhance the detrimental effects of both
“vaccine failure” and “failure to vaccinate.”
The nature of global polio transmission has now fundamentally changed. Where
at one time immunity from natural exposure and vaccination allowed us to reach
elimination thresholds in most regions of the world, countries with eliminated trans-
mission now rely on vaccination alone for continued population immunity [46]. While
non-endemic countries remain at risk, maintaining elimination will be a continued
and increasing cost on public health programs. Thus it is urgent to achieve elimina-
tion goals which is accomplished by understanding the difficulties in the remaining
endemic nations. In this work, we expand our previous model of polio transmission
to explore how “failure to vaccinate” in certain regions may impede elimination in
other regions through migration.
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4.3 Materials and methods
4.3.1 Migration model construction
Our polio migration model was constructed as a deterministic, compartmental
transmission system accounting for 1) vaccine transmission, 2) waning immunity, 3)
age, 4) varying vaccination rates, and 5) migration. The model presented here is an
extension of the transmission model constructed in chapter III and thus topics 1) –
4) are covered in extensive detail in section 3.3 and appendix B.
To model migration, we considered two connected populations: a source popu-
lation and a destination population. Each subpopulation was constructed with the
same structure as the polio transmission model presented in chapter III. Here we
focus on unidirectional migration as depicted in figure 4.1. Unidirectional migration
is an atypical assumption in migration models (see section 1.2.2.5) but is a subset of
multi-population models where the populations are not fully coupled. Our model is
applicable to scenarios where the destination population cannot influence the source
population. This could describe rural-urban migration where poor, rural migrants
settle in developing urban areas, a scenario common in northern India [30], Pakistan
[90], and Nigeria [26]. Furthermore, the model can be also be interpreted where
the source population represents an abstract pool of migratory individuals coming
from different transmission conditions with variable vaccination levels. In either case,
vaccination rates and transmission conditions in the destination population do not
influence source populations.
The rate of migration, α, was modeled as a log rate in contrast to an exponential
rate because yearly population percent changes were more conventional and inter-
pretable. For example, if α is 0.01, then that is interpreted as a migration rate of 1%
per year. We assumed that migration is not differential by infection because polio
















φj + ΛV jκγi
log(1 + α) log(1 + α)
Figure 4.1:
Two population migration model with one population migrating into an-
other. Each subpopulation has susceptible, infected, and vaccinated pop-
ulations. Subpopulations and rates with superscript zero denote hetero-
geneities between the two populations. For the forces of infection, Λ0, the
only parameter that was varied between the populations was the contact
rate, c. Parameters and rates for polio transmission in each subpopula-
tion are described in table 3.1. Parameters and rates specific to migration
population are described in table 4.1.
fixed. Details on the model equations associated with migration are in appendix C.1.
4.3.2 Migration model analysis
The source and destination population differ by transmission conditions and vac-
cination rates. Parameters specific to the migration model are presented in table
4.1.
We assumed that birth rates, death rates, immunity waning rates, and OPV trans-
missibility were equivalent across the source and destination population. If birth and
death rates were different between the populations, we expect that the populations
would have different R0 values. However, because the vital dynamic parameters are
small relative to the contact rate and infection duration, the R0 calculation (table
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Table 4.1: Migration model parameters
Migration
Parameters Descriptions Values Interpretation
α Migration rate (% yr−1) 0.001–10a
c0 Contact rate in source c sameb
population (yr−1) 40 low
100 medium
200 high
φ0j Vaccination rate in 0 no program
source population (yr−1) 0.75 suboptimal
1 complete
2 intensive
aWide ranged used as a sensitivity analysis. See Appendix for more details on migration rates.
bThe destination population contact rate, c. See table 3.1
3.2) is not sensitive to small changes in birth or death rates.
Waning rates and OPV transmissibility are functions of the vaccine. Vaccine
efficacy varies across nations, specifically with respect to inducing immunity (take-
rates) [83], and is partially captured by varying the effective vaccination rates between
populations. However, we assumed that if a vaccination was successful (i.e., resulted
in induced immunity) then waning was the same across populations. We fixed the
waning rate such that it takes 10 years to reach 50% susceptibility, consistent with
the main results presented in our previous single population analysis [86]. Results for
a wider range of waning rates is presented in appendix C.2.1. We modeled vaccine
transmissibility relative to WPV and do not expect the relative relationship to vary
across populations. We fixed OPV transmissibility to be 5% of WPV. This is similar
to type 1 and 3 WPV [18], the remaining wild strains in endemic nations. Circulating
vaccine-derived polio virus (cVDPV) in Nigeria closely represents type 2 strain (which
has higher transmissibility), and therefore we presented a short analysis of higher OPV
transmissibility in the appendix C.2.2.
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To explore the effect of migration between interconnected populations, we varied
the migration rate across five orders of magnitude ranging from 0.001% to 10% yr−1.
Current net migration rates for Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan range between -3
and 8 per 1000 persons per year [91]. Because we aim to infer the effect of migration
on transmission dynamics in a given population, we use a wide rate range to capture
outcomes ranging from very low to very high levels of migration.
The goal of our analysis was to assess how poor vaccination programs of one
population could affect another population. Therefore, in the destination population,
we evaluated the influence of effective vaccination rates on prevalence levels under
varying conditions of R0 allowing migration from a source population with unique
vaccination rates and R0 levels (figure 4.1 and table 4.1). The effective vaccination
rates in the source population were selected to be 0, 0.75, 1, and 2 yr−1 corresponding
to no program, suboptimal coverage, complete coverage (100% coverage with no yearly
boosting) and intense coverage, respectively. R0 levels in the source population were
chosen to be either the same as the destination population or fixed at 4, 10, and 20
corresponding to low, medium, and high, respectively.
To assess vaccination program success, we constructed a measure incorporating the
prevalence levels under a given vaccination rate for varying R0 conditions. Specifically,
we evaluated vaccination effectiveness by measuring the maximum R0 where a given
vaccination rate reduces the population prevalence level below a target value. For the
target prevalence level, we selected a conservative cutoff of 1 in a one million where
the magnitude of infected individuals would be quite low given a real population size.
To evaluate how migration affects vaccination programs, we focused on the dynam-
ics of the destination population and assumed the source population was at steady
state. We conducted the model simulation as follows: 1) we simulated the source
population under vaccination until steady state; then 2) we simulated the destination
population under migration with no vaccination until steady state; and then 3) we
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introduced vaccination into the destination population over a linear implementation
period of 2 years until the target vaccination level was reached. Prevalence in the
destination population was assessed at two times: 1) at the minimum value induced
by initial vaccination; and 2) at the final steady state level.
All modeling was conducted using Python with the lsoda algorithm in the Numpy
module. Figures were made in R using the ggplot2 and lattice packages.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Vaccination effectiveness with no migration
Vaccination effectiveness was measured by determining the highest R0 where a
given vaccination rate can achieve a target prevalence of 1 in one million. Specifi-
cally, this illustrates the highest transmission conditions where a vaccination policy
can achieve the set goal. Vaccination effectiveness, however, may vary over time
where initial vaccination can reduce prevalence to very low levels but higher long-
term prevalence levels are possible. Figure 4.2 displays both the initial (4.2A) and
long-term (4.2B) effectiveness of a vaccination program when there is no migration.
Initial effectiveness was determined using the minimum prevalence within 50 years
of vaccination implementation and long-term effectiveness was determined using the
steady state final prevalence. Divergence between the minimum and final preva-
lence occurs under high transmission conditions when vaccination does not achieve
elimination. Under these conditions, long-term transmission is sustained by reinfec-
tion dynamics [86]. However, by achieving low levels of prevalence through initial
vaccination, elimination may result from stochastic or probabilistic die-off. In this
scenario, divergence in effectiveness highlights conditions where elimination my be
fragile. Thus, transmission and vaccination levels that demonstrate effectiveness in
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Vaccination effectiveness. Vaccination program effectiveness for a
given effective vaccination rate determined by A.) the minimum preva-
lence reached within the first 50 years of vaccine implementation and B.)
the final prevalence resulting from the vaccination program. Oral polio
vaccine (OPV) transmission was set to be 5% as transmissible as wild po-
liovius (WPV) and waning rates were set such it takes 10 years to reach
50% susceptibility. Vaccination effectiveness was measured, for a given
effective vaccination rate, as the maximum R0 (up to 20) where a target
final prevalence of less than 1 in a million was reached. R0 conditions
where the target prevalence is reached initially but not in the long-run
illustrate potential fragile elimination conditions.
4.4.2 Vaccination effectiveness depends on vaccination in migrating pop-
ulations
When migration is introduced, achieving the target prevalence levels depends on
the vaccination rate and transmission conditions in the source population (figure 4.3).
When there is no vaccination program in the source population, achieving the tar-
get prevalence is not possible unless there are low transmission condition and low
migration levels. Thus, in regions where migratory populations are an important
component of the population, leaving large portions of mobile populations complete
unvaccinated is absolutely detrimental to the overall vaccination program.
Both short and long-term vaccination effectiveness in the destination population
is reduced due to migration unless there is intense vaccination coverage in the source























0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3

































Migration rate (yr−1) No Migration 1 in 1,000 1 in 100
E
ffective vaccination rate in source population (yr −1)
Figure 4.3:
Vaccination effectiveness under migration across similar popula-
tions. Vaccination program effectiveness for a given effective vaccination
rate in the destination population across varying vaccination levels in the
source population (table 4.1) and migration rates. The source and des-
tination population share the same transmission conditions. Vaccination
program effectiveness was determined by column A.) the minimum preva-
lence reached within the first 50 years of vaccine implementation; and
column B.) the final prevalence resulting from the vaccination program.
Oral polio vaccine (OPV) transmission was set to be 5% as transmissible
as wild poliovius (WPV) and waning rates were set such it takes 10 years
to reach 50% susceptibility. The absence of lines indicates that reaching
the target prevalence was not possible under the given conditions.
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of introducing a vaccination program in the destination populations (column A in
figure 4.3) and long-term effectiveness is a measure of whether stable elimination can
be expected under the given vaccination program (column B in figure 4.3). In gen-
eral, compared to the initial success of vaccination implementation, achieving stable
elimination is more difficult, particularly in moderate to high transmission conditions
(figure 4.2) where source population vaccination is important under migration (fig-
ure 4.3). When coverage is complete in the source population, achieving short-term
success is possible under moderate transmission conditions but requires much higher
vaccinations rate than if there was no migration. Long-term success in moderate
transmission conditions requires higher levels of source population vaccination.
When migration reduces vaccination program effectiveness, there is less divergence
between short and long-term success. This occurs because achieving the target preva-
lence, either initially or at equilibrium, is difficult for high transmission conditions
when migration occurs from a poorly vaccinated source population. Therefore, under
conditions where migration is impeding success, the most useful interventions should
focus on overall transmission conditions and vaccinating migratory populations.
In highly mobile regions with similar transmission conditions, the effect of vac-
cination is sensitive to the coverage in migratory populations. Intense campaigns
hoping to quickly reduce prevalence in one region may have less than desirable effects
if connected regions are under-vaccinated. Furthermore, while long-term program
success is already difficult in moderate and high transmission conditions, it is more
difficult under conditions of migration from poorly vaccinated populations. Over-
all, populations under high transmission conditions with poorly vaccinated incoming
migratory populations will experience elimination difficultly without accounting for
both problems.
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4.4.3 Migration from high transmission conditions may greatly impede
vaccination effectiveness
When evaluating vaccination effectiveness in the destination population, increas-
ing the transmission conditions in the source population mitigates the effect of in-
creasing vaccination in the both populations (figure 4.4). When the source population
comes from medium transmission conditions (column B. in figure 4.4), less source pop-
ulation coverage is required to achieve an effective program in moderate transmission
conditions than when compared to migration from the same or high transmission
conditions. When migration occurs from high transmission conditions (column C. in
figure 4.4), intense coverage in the source population is critical to vaccination effec-
tiveness in the destination population where high vaccination levels are also required.
These results demonstrate that when migratory populations come from high trans-
mission conditions, greater levels of vaccination are necessary in both the source and
destination population while effectiveness is reduced. Under these conditions, gener-
ally implementing successful vaccination programs becomes much more difficult. It
is therefore crucial to not only ensure that migratory populations are well vaccinated
but that other strategies to reduce transmission are considered.
4.4.4 Migration from low transmission conditions
When there is migration in the model, the effect of migrating populations from
a source population with low R0 conditions is minimal on vaccination effectiveness
in the destination population (figure C.5 in the appendix). Migration has no effect
at complete coverage levels in the source population. This indicates that low trans-
mission populations under vaccination programs are not a major hindrance on other
populations’ elimination efforts.
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Migration rate (yr−1) No Migration 1 in 1,000 1 in 100
E
ffective vaccination rate in source population (yr −1)
R0 level in source population
Figure 4.4:
Long-term vaccination effectiveness under migration across pop-
ulations with different transmission conditions. Vaccination pro-
gram effectiveness for a given effective vaccination rate in the destination
population across varying vaccination levels and transmission conditions
in the source population and migration rates (table 4.1). Transmission
conditions in the source population were set to be column A.) the same
as the destination population; column B.) medium (R0=10); or column
C.) high (R0=20). Long-term vaccination effectiveness was measured, for
a given effective vaccination rate, as the maximum R0 (up to 20) where
the final (steady state) prevalence in the destination population was less
than 1 in a million. Oral polio vaccine (OPV) transmission was set to be
5% as transmissible as wild poliovius (WPV) and waning rates were set
such it takes 10 years to reach 50% susceptibility. The absence of lines




4.5.1 Model application to the remaining endemic countries
Achieving polio eradication is a global effort dependent on reaching elimination in
the three remaining endemic nations: Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan. By explor-
ing migration, we contextualized polio transmission dynamics across interdependent
populations specifically focusing on how heterogeneous vaccination policies and trans-
mission conditions affect vaccination success. When regions “failure to vaccinate,”
they may impede campaigns in other regions. Our model illustrates the extent to
which this failure impacts regional campaigns due to migration.
Elimination in India has been attributed to implementing high vaccination cov-
erage and switching to monovalent OPV, which induces better immunity against the
remaining wild strains [29]. There was specific focus on finding internal migratory
populations and ensuring that they were routinely vaccinated. Our model reaffirms
the success of this strategy where an increase in effective vaccination rates in both the
destination and source populations are crucial to ensuring that prevalence levels are
decreased even in high transmission conditions. However, under these transmission
conditions, the elimination may be fragile and the region may be capable of sustaining
transmission again in the future. Thus it becomes increasingly important to sustain
the effort in India while reaching elimination in the remaining endemic nations.
When migratory flows come from high transmission conditions, it becomes more
difficult to achieve elimination even with high levels of vaccination. Evidence shows
that Pakistan and Afghanistan continually transmit across borders [54] and that Pak-
istan sustains high transmissions conditions similar to those that India experienced
[87]. Furthermore, there are high levels of internal migration in Pakistan [90]. Our
analysis indicates that under high transmission conditions, elimination in Pakistan
requires that they implement a good vaccination program. Interruption of vaccination
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programs due to poor governance or violence may be a serious hindrance in achieving
elimination in Pakistan and potentially in border regions of Afghanistan. Lapses in
coverage not only make elimination difficult or impossible but also creates conditions
where importation to other regions becomes more likely.
Nigeria, the only African nation with endemic polio, periodically seeds outbreaks
in neighboring nations [45, 46]. The difficulties in achieving elimination within Nige-
ria can be attributed to many issues including population aversion to vaccination
in northern regions [92], high transmission conditions, poor coverage and immunity
levels [87], high levels of combined immigration and emigration [89], and poor vaccina-
tion coverage in mobile populations [26]. Recently, Nigeria has worked to increase its
vaccination coverage but still remains endemic [46]. In the context of our migration
model, Nigeria may comprise a worst-case scenario. Reduced population immunity
may indicate poor take-rates (low effective vaccination) or fast waning rates. High
population mobility may indicate high migration levels between regions or urban cen-
ters potentially comprising source and destination populations with low vaccination
rates. Particularly, reaching stable elimination may be difficult, and intense cam-
paigns without blanket coverage may not even achieve initial success. A campaign
similar to that of India may find success in Nigeria, but a sustained effort has histor-
ically proven difficult. Additional interventions may be desirable to find short-term
success including efforts to improve public health in general (e.g., reducing poor san-
itation conditions) or adult boosting with IPV. IPV boosting (following previous
immunization OPV) may be effective in inducing mucosal immunity [83, 84] and is
not a risk for cVDPV, another major concern in Nigeria [45, 46].
4.5.2 Model limitations
The limitations and assumptions of our single population polio transmission model
have been previously described [86]. Additional simplifying assumptions were re-
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quired to characterize migration in this framework. While migration rates could be
independent of polio infection, migration may be age-based or seasonal. In regions
with large rates of migration like Afghanistan, families tend to migrate together [93],
so age may play a smaller role in determining migration rates. However, because
vaccination campaigns target children, age-dependent migration rates may elucidate
scenarios for susceptible or infected adults to play an important role in transmission
through importation. Because importation outbreaks are rarer, probabilistic events,
they are better modeled using a stochastic model.
Our model utilizes unidirectional migration which assumes that connected popu-
lations are not fully coupled. In this case, policy and conditions in the destination
population cannot affect the source population. This may apply to circumstances
where migrants are unlikely to return to their home population (e.g., rural to urban
migration). Abstractly, this model can be interpreted such that the source popula-
tion is a pool of potentially hard to reach migrants thus demonstrating that these
poorly vaccinated populations can have detrimental effects on their destination pop-
ulation. A contrasting scenario would be work-based or refugee migration between
interconnected regions where people or families may spend a significant time in mul-
tiple populations but are likely to return to their home population within a short
period of time. Synchrony between fully coupled populations may demonstrate sce-
narios where migration is beneficial, as demonstrated in an SIR model analysis with
vaccination [25]. However, from our analysis, looking at scenarios where the source
population has a higher vaccination rates than the destination population (figures 4.3
and 4.4), there are not general conditions where migration is beneficial, particularly
for moderate to high transmission conditions in the destination population.
Compared to assessing initial dynamics in the single population model [86], more
assumptions were required to define the initial success of vaccination implementation
in the migration model. In our approach, we assumed the source population was
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already at steady state. This implies that the source population has stable transmis-
sion dynamics and that its vaccination implementation does not affect the destination
population. An interpretation of this scenario would be that the migratory popula-
tions in the destination population are missed by campaigns or routine coverage of
the region. Thus, in this context, there are no ramp-ups in coverage in the source
population that would affect the destination population. Abstractly, we are assessing
how the average population of migrants affects their destination population. We do
not make inferences regarding increasing campaigns in both populations but rather
focus on the impedance of poorly vaccinated migrating populations on their destina-
tion population. The alternatives to this approach are potentially complicated (e.g.,
partial synchronous coverage increases in both populations) and may be better ap-
plied to models that apply to scenarios where there is coupling between the source
and destination populations.
We assumed migration was a deterministic, continuous process. Thus our model
may not be appropriate for mass migration events or rare migration events. We
explored our model over five orders of magnitude of migration rates to assess our
results over a wide range of phenomena associated with increasing migration. Based
on this sensitivity analysis, migration becomes an important factor between migration
rates of 0.1% and 1% per year and so our main results focused on these values. When
migration rates were set to 1 in 100,000 yr−1, the effect of migration was entirely
lost demonstrating that the continuous nature of the model does not necessarily
overstate the effect of slightly connected populations. This model was not designed
to predict outbreaks based on sporadic viral importation which should be modeled
using a stochastic approach [85].
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4.6 Conclusions
The current era of the polio eradication initiative is concurrently triumphant and
frustrating. Achieving elimination in India demonstrated that success can be achieved
in high transmission conditions among difficult to target populations. The strategy
in India illustrates the importance of efforts that address both “vaccine failure” and
“failure to vaccinate.” The remaining endemic regions, under more varying transmis-
sion conditions, have been described by similar difficulty to achieve coverage, partic-
ularly with variable governance and cooperation. By highlighting the importance of
interconnectedness in polio transmission dynamics, we demonstrated that connected
populations require synchronous efforts to ensure broad and complete coverage. Fur-
thermore, achieving elimination is aided substantially by targeting migratory popu-
lations that tend to have lower coverage. In high migration and high transmission
regions, additional sanitation interventions may substantially increase the likelihood
of success. As public health officials act with urgency, ramping up coverage and
specifically targeting hard to reach populations in Pakistan and Nigeria potentially
holds the final key to eradication success.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusions and future work
5.1 Summary
In this work, we developed and analyzed dynamic models of infectious diseases at
the host, population, and multiple population level. We assessed host immunity at
these levels to demonstrate the importance of host biology in disease modeling. At
the host level, differing exposure patterns may elicit different risks of infection due to
the innate immune response (chapter II). At the population level, immunity levels af-
fect success of vaccination programs in polio transmission due to reinfection dynamics
(chapter III). At the multiple population level of polio transmission, vaccination pro-
grams may be impeded by migration from populations with poor vaccination coverage
(chapter IV).
5.1.1 Conclusions from Chapter II
In chapter II, we developed a dynamic dose-response model that accounted for
differing exposure patterns to assess how the immune response affects the risk of
infection. Because infection systems vary with respect to pathogen, host, and contact
site, pathogen clearance rates may depend on exposure patterns. We 1) illustrated
the versatility of the dynamic dose-response model for risk calculations across varying
exposure scenarios; 2) developed a method to fit the model parameters to time-series
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data using a survival likelihood; 3) applied the model to the anthrax infection system;
4) showed that infection risk of anthrax is invariant to exposure patterns given the
available data; and 5) recommended dose-response experiments that can demonstrate
when risks vary by exposure patterns.
The dynamic dose-response model was developed to allow the risk of infection
to be sensitive to dose-timing effects. This was accomplished by including dynamic
pathogen clearance due to the initial immune response. This framework is an ex-
tension of the IAH, the classic assumption for dose-response models that any single
pathogen has an independent, non-zero risk of initiating infection. Specifically, while
any single pathogen can initiate infection, we allowed the joint pathogen probability
of infection to vary depending exposure patterns. The model was also designed to be
versatile for contexts when risk is invariant to exposure patterns.
To use the model as a risk assessment tool, we developed a survival analysis
approach for fitting the model parameters to time-series data. We applied this ap-
proach to anthrax using previously collected time-series data. In this analysis, we
demonstrated how to apply the model to imperfect data through the use of censoring
intervals, incorporation of biological properties of the pathogen, and profile likeli-
hood techniques. We then identified recommendations for future experiments that
can demonstrate when risk depends on exposure patterns. Our dose-response model
is ideal to analyze these experiments because it also identifies when risk is invariant
to exposure patterns.
Based on our results, risk of anthrax infection is only slightly dependent on ex-
posure patterns. We therefore conclude that risk assessment with respect to anthrax
depends more on the total amount of spores released rather than on how it was re-
leased. The risk calculations from our model were consistent with past dose-response
models of anthrax demonstrating that our model is a viable tool for risk assessment.
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5.1.2 Conclusions from Chapter III
In chapter III, we developed a transmission model to assess both successes and
failures in polio eradication. To model polio transmission, we developed a model
focusing on waning immunity and transmission of OPV. We concluded that 1) short-
term success is possible through vaccination implementation; 2) long-term transmis-
sion is driven by reinfection dynamics at high vaccination rates when elimination is
not achieved; and 3) OPV transmissibility acts as a population booster mitigating
the effects of reinfection. Our conclusions imply that additional interventions, such
as adult boosting or improvement in sanitary conditions, may enhance eradication
efforts.
In this analysis, we explored short-term and long-term outcomes of vaccination
implementation. Initial vaccination implementation is capable of reducing prevalence
levels to very low levels. This is possible even under high transmission conditions
and fast waning immunity through the use of high vaccination rates. However, these
regions can still sustain long-term prevalence levels through reinfection transmission.
By varying OPV transmissibility, we demonstrated that population boosting through
vaccine transmission attenuates reinfection transmission thus reducing the elimina-
tion threshold. This is consistent with the notion that elimination of WPV type 2
was aided heavily by a highly transmissibility vaccine strain. Furthermore, the effec-
tiveness of boosting indicates that expanding vaccination to older population could
substantially reduce population transmission capacity.
5.1.3 Conclusions from Chapter IV
In chapter IV, we extended the transmission model in chapter III to include mi-
gration. We demonstrated that vaccination effectiveness can be reduced due to migra-
tion from populations with variable vaccination policies and transmission conditions.
Specifically, we showed that under migration, 1) short and long-term vaccination ef-
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fectiveness require adequate vaccination in the migratory populations; 2) migration
from high transmission conditions makes vaccination success difficult; and 3) reduc-
tion in transmission conditions could substantially aid vaccination success.
We then applied our analysis to explain success in India and failure in the remain-
ing endemic regions; Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In India, recent elimination
was achieved by increasing vaccine efficacy and targeting internal migration [29]. Our
model analysis demonstrated that these are the key components in achieving elim-
ination under high transmission conditions with high migration rates. Nigeria has
demonstrated how poor vaccination coverage can continually prevent achieving elim-
ination. Afghanistan and Pakistan describe connected populations with dissimilar
transmission conditions where migration may be impeding vaccination programs [87].
Our model suggests that success in the remaining endemic regions may rely on focus-
ing on hard to reach, migratory populations. In combination with chapter III, intense
vaccination campaign or additional intervention efforts may be crucial to reduce polio
transmission and achieve eradication.
5.2 Future Work
5.2.1 Applications and extensions of the dynamic dose-response model
The dynamic dose-response model has potential for many future applications. It
has been used to design an experiment assessing time-dependent risk of tularemia
and analyze the outcome data (data unpublished). In this context, our model is a
simple tool for more complicated risk assessments. Specifically, it can be used to both
evaluate time-series dose-response data and make risk inferences for scenarios that
involve variable exposure patterns.
Further extension of the dynamic dose-response model involves implementation
into transmission models. Transmission models generally make simplifying assump-
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tions about the risk of transmission. For environmentally mediated transmission
systems, exposure and risk are a function of different routes of exposure such as air,
fomites, or food contamination. The dynamic dose-response model provides a frame-
work to differentially characterize risk based on varying exposures. Further, trans-
mission model sensitivity to time-dependent risk could be assessed by implementing
different parameterizations of the dose-response model.
Lastly, the framework of the model could be extended to include activation of
the adaptive immune system. This would have importance in transmission systems
were exposures occur continuously over long periods of time (e.g., regions with poor
sanitation). Furthermore, transmission risk could be additionally characterized by
partial immunity. For vaccination, the extended model with adaptive immunity could
be used to assess optimal schedules for vaccination requiring periodic boosting.
5.2.2 Extensions for the polio transmission model
The waning immunity framework implemented in chapters III and IV is a simplis-
tic realization of the actual waning process. One important extension of the modeling
framework is to inform experiments to better quantify the waning immunity process.
Then the next step would be implementing more complicated immunity structures
into the transmission model to assess robustness to immunity assumptions. If im-
mune response varies between WPV and OPV, model inferences may be affected. A
better described waning immunity framework may be extended to other pathogens
with vaccination and partial immunity, such as measles and pertussis.
The next extension to the polio transmission model includes the relaxation of the
continuous, deterministic model framework. To properly assess stochastic die-off, the
model needs to be implemented as a discrete, stochastic model where elimination
is an outcome from initial prevalence reduction due to vaccination implementation.
Furthermore, vaccination was modeled as a continuous, effective rate. Our analysis
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demonstrated robustness to a vaccine that induced partial immunity where boosting
was required to reach full immune status. However, mass immunization campaigns
do not occur continuously and may be best modeled by using vaccination rates and
coverage that occurs discretely or as a periodic pulse. At the population level, vac-
cination does not occur continuously throughout the year and coverage lapses may
occur in random pockets of the population. Lastly, the migration model had similar
simplifying assumptions where modeling migration as a stochastic process may be a
better characterization of movement between populations particularly if migratory
populations are small relative to the destination population size.
Combining the work from all of the chapters, the polio transmission model could
be extended to include environmental transmission, a reservoir from stable and mi-
gratory populations, where risk of infection is calculated using the dynamic dose-
response model. Ultimately, using the extended dose-response model with adaptive
immunity, risk in environmentally transmitted polio could be characterized by both
time-dependent exposure patterns and variable partial immunity levels.
5.3 Public health implications
5.3.1 Dynamic dose-response modeling
Dynamic dose-response models in general have important applications as a public
health tools. We have demonstrated the use of the model as a risk assessment through
the analysis of anthrax. For epidemiological models, exposure through the environ-
ment can elicit differing exposure patterns. Using the dynamic dose-response model
can therefore adjust for varying risk from heterogeneous exposures patterns in both
transmission models and risk assessments. There is also potential use for the model
to study vaccine protocols. For multiple-dose live vaccines, the use of this dynamic
dose-response modeling framework could elucidate proper dosing schemes that will
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ensure optimized vaccine boosting.
5.3.2 Global polio eradication
Eradicating polio would constitute an major public health triumph. The use of
transmission models allows public health officials to characterize the causal processes
of transmission and assess intervention efforts. Using our polio transmission model,
we assessed the successes and failure of the polio eradication campaign. Particularly,
through exploration of waning immunity and transmission of the vaccine, we demon-
strated that reinfection dynamics may be the driving component of transmission when
vaccination levels do not achieve elimination under high transmission conditions. We
further demonstrated, through the migration model, that eradication campaigns are
joint efforts and lagging nations may impede efforts in other nations. Using our
model analysis, we made public health recommendations focusing on expanded adult
vaccination, additional interventions, and targeting mobile populations. While these






Additional material for a dynamic dose-response
model to account for exposure patterns in risk
assessment: a case study in inhalation anthrax
A.1 Functional families for time-dependent dose function
This section aims to mathematically formalize the idea of time-dependence when
analyzing dose-response. We examine implications of the time-independence assump-
tion given that the immune system is a dynamic process that affects the risk of
infection; i.e., the infection outcome due to one pathogen particle depends on the
state of the hosts immune system, which in turn is determined by prior exposure to
pathogens. Let F be the candidate function for dose-response that represents the
risk of infection for a sequence of n doses, d, inoculated at time intervals ∆t. For
simplicity, we assume that doses are evenly spaced. Under the condition that the
time between inoculations tends to zero, the candidate function F can be represented
as
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F ({dt0+i∆t}n−1i=0 ) = F (
n−1∑
i=0
dt0+i∆t) when ∆t→ 0 (A.1)
In this case, the probability of infection is equivalent to the probability of the
accumulated dose. Because the time between inoculations is so small, the immune
system does not have time to react to the initial doses, and therefore, the infectivity
can be characterized as a single accumulated exposure. For large time intervals, the
inoculations are so sparse that before a new inoculation arrives the immune system has
time to clear out the previous inoculated dose, and therefore, go back to equilibrium.
In this case, the probability of infection for the sequence corresponds to the evaluation
of n independent events; i.e. the probability of infection of a given dose is independent
of the previous doses. This condition is represented as
F ({dt0+i∆t}n−1i=0 ) = 1−
n−1∏
i=0
(1− F (dt0+i∆t)) when ∆t→∞ (A.2)
Finally, we have the non-extreme case, where the time intervals are neither short
nor long. This condition is represented as
F ({dt0+i∆t}n−1i=0 ) < F ({dt0+j∆t}
n−1
j=0 ) when ∆ti > ∆tj (A.3)
The risk of infection decreases as the time between inoculation events increases.
Longer intervals between inoculation events imply more time for the immune system
to clear out the pathogens from previous doses. When a new dose arrives the immune
system is still actively engaging pathogens from the first dose, and the number of
remaining pathogens depends on the time interval between inoculations. The longer
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the time between inoculations, the fewer pathogens that remain, and consequently, the
more likely the immune system is to successfully eliminate the pathogens and prevent
infection. The canonical dose-response model used in microbial risk assessment and
in environmentally-mediated transmission models is the exponential. In this model,
the probability of infection depends solely on the dose, and consequently, the state of
the individuals immune system prior to the doses exposure is not considered. Given
a dose, D, and risk parameter, k, the risk of infection from a single pathogen is
PrInf(D) = 1− e−kD (A.4)
The probability of infection is one minus the probability of no infection, which
is the probability that none of the D independent trials with a probability, k, are
positive. In the exponential model, the probability of infection of a single pathogen,
k, is estimated from data of empirical dose-response trials, and by definition, it is
independent of previous inoculation events.
To assess whether or not the exponential model is a good candidate for F we
demonstrate that the risk of infection predicted by the exponential is the same re-
gardless of the time interval between inoculations. The following example illustrates
the implications of this time-independence. Two individuals are inoculated with a
pathogen following the standard procedure of empirical dosing trials. Subject a is
exposed to one pathogen every week for twenty years, which add up to 1040 total
pathogens. Subject b receives the same dose, 1040 pathogens, in the course of 5 min-
utes. If the probability of infection is time-independent, both subjects should have
the same probability of becoming infected. This extreme example illustrates the po-
tential problems of not taking time between inoculation and the immune system into
account in calculating the risk associated to a dose. One might expect the immune
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system to be able to efficiently deal with a single pathogen every week, as opposed
to dealing with 1040 pathogens at once. In more realistic examples the timing of
inoculation may also have a significant impact on risk estimates. It is unlikely that
an inoculation in a real scenario is a singular, isolated event, but rather a sequence
of events at different time intervals and different dosage.
One way to capture these dynamics is by using a stochastic process model that
accounts for interactions of pathogens and immune particles[10]. However, such a
detailed individual-level model is computationally too complex to integrate into pop-
ulation level transmission models. Events in the immune system such as the growth
of pathogens and deactivation of pathogens by immune particles occur at faster time
scales than the events of the transmission models such as individuals making contact
and recovery from infection. Furthermore, a detailed model of the pathogen-immune
particle interactions requires a model of the immune system for each individual in the
population.
A.2 Closed-form risk and dose calculations when α = 1
When α = 1, the solution to the integral of P (t) can be described as a closed form
solution. Recall from § 2.3.3 that for α = 1, the solution to the differential equation
(2.1) can be given as an exponential function
P (t) = 1− de−tγ (A.5)
Now consider a sequence of n inoculations given over n time points as discussed in
§ 2.3.3. To evaluate the total effective dose, we need to integrate our dosing function
over the entire exposure course up to a final time point, T . Note that we assume the





























−γ(tn−1−t1) + · · ·+ dn−2e−γ(tn−1−tn−2) + dn−1
We can simplify these calculations further such that for any given inoculation point,









−γ(ti−tj), i > 1 ∩ α = 1
(A.7)
These values have to be described using a recursive formula (equation 2.4) when α 6= 1.
This closed form solution was calculated by using the relationship that d′i = di + pi.
We see that when the clearance function is exponential, the remaining dose at any
time is a linear combination of the inoculations. I.e., the dose at any time can be
simply calculated by applying exponential decay to each inoculation independently
and summing the results. The decay is only dependent upon γ, a fixed parameter,
and the chosen time. When α < 1, this property is lost because the decay depends on
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both and the previous inoculation sizes, the factor 1/dα−1i . By using this derivation
we can solve the total effective dose at any given time analytically. It also can be used
to find the error associated with assuming that the final time point, T , is equivalent
to the extinction time of infinity when α = 1. First let us look at the solution to the

































By summing across each piece, we find the following solution to equation (A.6)
∫ T
0






Furthermore, if we let T →∞, we find the total effective dose to be
∫ ∞
0






an independent sum of each inoculation. Thus, if we assume that all doses have









For small inoculations and large γ, this error diminishes very quickly. For other
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conditions, a calculation may be necessary to ensure a sizeable pathogen level is not
ignored. In our analysis of the Brachman data, the monkeys were observed in a dose-
free environment for periods in which the total within host pathogen level was far
below 1 (by our parameter estimations) before they were sacrificed.
Now to calculate risk over an entire dosing period until time, T , we make the
appropriate substitutions into our survival function and get the following formula







and if we assume that T →∞ (i.e.,T  tn−1) we calculate the following risk formula







Note that this resembles the exponential function where k = s/γ. Further, if we
consider each inoculation to extinction independently for a risk calculation, the risk
calculation is equivalent. That is, when α = 1 under the conditions of dose extinc-
tion, our model is equivalent to the exponential model in that risk is independent of
exposure patterns and timing. Where the models differ is for evaluating risks at times
before assumed within host pathogen extinction by a function of the error term.
A.3 Censoring intervals and lag period
Consider a subject who becomes infected in interval, (Tj,l, Tj,r), bounded by the
last observed time before infection and first observed time after infection. The l and
r notation denote the left time point and right time point in this censored interval.
We can then redefine f(Tj) as follows
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f(Tj) = S(Tj,l)− S(Tj,r) (A.14)
The problem of potential jump discontinuities would occur in a situation where
the interval limits correspond directly to an inoculation time. Recall that the dose
function is formulated to be left continuous and thus the inoculations are not counted
when approaching from the right. For example, consider a scenario where an infection
occurred between days 12 and 13 and inoculations occurred at the start of day 12
and 13. S(12) would not be calculated using the inoculation given at day 12, but
S(13) would. However, the inoculation on day 13 would be used by neither (it is
assumed not to contribute to the infection likelihood for the given subject). Likelihood
equation (2.12) can then be adjusted accordingly by splitting integrands at the interval
times, which results in equation (A.15). T+j,l and T
−
j,l denote the direction of limit

































To implement the τ parameter, we adjusted the final observation time by Tj =
Tj − τ∆j. Equation (A.16) illustrates the assignment of Tj based on a jth subjects
infection status, given by ∆j, where ∆j = 1 when infection occurs and ∆j = 0 when
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Tj, ∆j = 0
Tj − τ, ∆j = 1
(A.16)
Since we have limited information on the lag between infection and death, we do
not assess lagged infection times as exact times of infection. Instead we use interval
censoring such that we assume that the infection occurred sometime over a given
day. For example, if a monkey death occurs on day 15 with lag τ=10 days, then the
infection occurred sometime during day 5. This would be evaluated as f(5)=S(5)-
S(6) as described in equation (A.14). Previous studies have shown that time between
symptoms and death is on the scale of several hours for Cynomogus monkeys[56] so
we do not think symptom onset would aid in finding the total lag period.
This lag period, τ , was treated as a population parameter but it is likely prob-
abilistic in nature. Based on prior studies[56] that this lag is variable, a variety of
τ values were initially implemented, ranging between 1-13 days. Further review of
other anthrax models, specifically Brookmeyer et al.[58], suggested that these lag pe-
riods from infection to symptoms are relatively short, less than 4 days on average.
This is explained in more detail in the § 2.3.6. We aimed to treat τ as a nuisance
and eliminate it from the optimization. This was done statistically by assuming that
τ was took potential values of 1, 2, 3, or 4 days with equal probability. Thus we
evaluated the likelihood for each of these fixed τ values and then weighted it by their
probability (Pr(τ = i) = 25% for i =1, 2, 3, or 4). This was done formally using
conditional expectations. Note that the likelihood is represented by the conditional
probability of infection given τ .
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A.4 Results extension to α > 1
As briefly described, it is mathematically possible to allow values in the range
α > 1. The biological interpretation of this range relies on a priming interpretation.
That is, larger inoculation makes the immune system more effective and therefore re-
sults in faster clearance, which does not seem biologically plausible. However, another
scenario is that immune response is detrimental to clearance, as recruitment occurs
over time from prior inoculations, clearance becomes more inefficient. This scenario
would seem plausible for pathogens that target the immune response to initiate infec-
tion. A problem arises when we consider confidence intervals extending past α = 1,
and thus conflicting biological assumptions must be statistically considered.
The dynamics of the model when α > 1 describe a complete reversal in risk calcu-
lations in that large bolus exposures have smaller risks (due to smaller accumulated
effective doses) than their evenly distributed counterparts. When α = 1, we do not
expect any difference in risk between exposure patterns (of same total dose). De-
lineating between dose timing effects and variability is dependent on the power of
our statistics. We thus expect that when α values are close to 1 that the confidence
intervals will cover significant ranges of α < 1 and α > 1 which encompass conflicting
biological assumptions about the effectiveness of the immune system. For example,
if we unbound α in the Brachman analysis, we extend the upper bound of our CI to
1.48 despite having an MLE α̂=0.90. These results are seen in figure A.1.
The MLE values of s and become unstable as α → 2. This is a mathematical
phenomenon associated with a singularity of the dose function family at α = 2. For
these function families, the dose function no longer converges to 0, even as t → ∞.
I.e., the total effective dose integrates to infinity. That is, for values that are not
arbitrarily large, the risk approaches infinity as t approaches infinity as α approaches
2. These results are not included.
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Figure A4.1:  Results from optimization profile over  with relaxed constraints on .  A spline 
curve was fit to determine the minimum negative log likelihood (at =0.90) and to determine the 
95% CI (0.51, 1.48) using the log likelihood ratio test. 
 


















Results from optimization profile over α with relaxed constraints on α.
A spline curve was fit to determine the minimum negative log likelihood
(to determine α̂ =0.90) and to determine the 95% CI (0.51, 1.48) using
the log likelihood ratio test.
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APPENDIX B
Additional material for successes and
shortcomings of polio eradication: a transmission
modeling analysis
B.1 Overview of appendix
This appendix provides details of model equations, assumptions, inputs, and addi-
tional results. For background on model development, B.2 describes the formulation
of the model and its differential equations with B.3 describing the aging structure
and B.4 describing the immunity and waning structure. B.5 includes additional re-
sults focusing on waning rates, alternative model structures, expanding vaccination
implementation time, model dynamics, and OPV transmission.
B.2 Transmission model structure and equations
The structure of our model is a hybrid of standard SIS and SIRS models. Our
model is a deterministic compartmental model with 3 basic states: S (susceptible,
i.e. not currently infected with either WPV or OPV), I (infected with WPV), and V
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(infected with OPV). We further indexed each of these states by immunity stages, i,
and age group, j, so the notation Si,j indicates the uninfected population in immunity
stage i and age group j. There are m total age groups (see section B.3) and n total
immune stages (see section B.4). Immunity generated from previous infections reduces
susceptibility (βi) to reinfection, and then reduces contagiousness (θi) and increases
recovery rate (γi) for subsequent reinfections. We collapsed the contact rate and
infection per contact probability into a single parameter, c, defined as an effective
contact rate. In a fully susceptible population, the incidence rate is the product of
the susceptible population, the infected population, and the effective contact rate.
Reducing contagiousness affects the force of infection, ΛI and ΛV , from I and V,













The force of infection generated by those infected with OPV was attenuated by ε < 1,
a constant reduction in contagiousness independent of immunity and age.
The following set of ordinary differential equations describes the continuous time
evolution of the population in each Si,j compartment. Movement across age groups
was modeled as a pure-delay process, i.e., it is instantaneous at fixed time steps
described in further detail in section B.3. Death rates, µj, and vaccination rates, φj
depended only on age. For concreteness, φj was taken to be the effective vaccination
rate for an individual’s age group, which we regarded as being equal to the product
of the actual vaccination rate and the average vaccine efficacy in individuals with no
previous exposure to either OPV or WPV. Further, the population size, N0, was
normalized to 1 by finding the equilibrium value of birth flow, b, into compartment
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S0,0, corresponding to the lowest immune level (i = 0) and the youngest age group





µ0 + (ΛI + ΛV + φ0)β0
)
S0,0. (B.2)





µj + (ΛI + ΛV + φj)β0
)
S0,j. (B.3)
Since the S0,j compartments are characterized by no immunity, they have full sus-
ceptibility (i.e., β0 = 1). By assumption we did not allow waning back into S0,j.
However, for S0<i<n−1,j, we fixed a duration rate, ωi, to describe movement across
Si,j compartments corresponding to waning immunity (see B.4.2). The general form





µj + ωi + (ΛI + ΛV + φj)βi
)
Si,j. (B.4)




γi(Ii,j + κVi,j). (B.5)
We assumed that the entire infected population (I and V) recovers at rate, Γj, into
the highest state of immunity (Sn−1,j), where re-infection could not occur. Thus the
differential equation for Sn−1,j is
dSn−1,j
dt
= Γj − (µj + ωn−1)Sn−1,j, (B.6)
Recovery from OPV infection was assumed to occur faster than that of WPV infection
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by constant κ > 1. The relative transmissibility of OPV to WPV is described by ε/κ
where 0 < ε/κ < 1.
The differential equations for I and V, respectively, are
dIi,j
dt
= ΛIβiSi,j − (µj + γi)Ii,j (B.7a)
dVi,j
dt
= (ΛV + φj)βiSi,j − (µj + κγi)Vi,j (B.7b)
The R0 values used in our analysis were calculated as c/γ0. Table B.1 summarizes
the model inputs. The differential equations were solved numerically using Python
software set with lsoda method and variable tolerance (absolute and/or relative)
ranging from 1×e−8 to 1×e−12.
B.3 Age structure in the model
Three processes depended only on age group, j: the pure delay aging (described
below); death, which occurs at a rate µj; and vaccination, φj, which targets a set
of age groups. We grouped the population by age into a total of m groups, using
10 half-year compartments for <5-year olds, 10 single-year compartments for 5 to
15-year olds, and 14 five-year compartments for 15-85 year olds (m = 10 + 10 + 14
= 34). By this parameterization, an age of 85 is an absorbing state and corresponds
to anyone 85 or older. Death rates from these age groups were set consistent with
observations from India [94]. We looked at reducing death rates as much as three-
fold from India and saw only a small increase in R0 suggesting that the phenomena
described in our results (importance of effects of OPV transmission, waning rates,
R0, and vaccination rates) remain unchanged.
Age-specific vaccination schedules cannot be consistently implemented using a
continuous aging process. We modeled aging as a pure-delay process which is consis-
tent with past models of measles and pertussis [81, 82]. Specifically, at a set time,
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Description Symbol Input Values
Total Immune Stages n 10
Total Age Groups m 34. B.3 for further details.
Population Size N0 1 (Constant)
Birth Rate b 0.0249968
Contact Rate c 40-220
Death rate of population in age com-
partment j
µj Age-specific Death Rates from
India[94]
Vaccination rate for the population in
age compartment j
φj Varies. Discussed in Text.
Relative contagiousness of OPV com-
pared to WPV
ε Varies. Discussed in Text.
Relative recovery rate from OPV com-
pared to WPV
κ 1/ε
Waning rates affecting susceptibility rβ Varies, see caption.
Waning rates affecting susceptibility rθ, rγ rβ/4.
Minimum Recovery Rate (No Immu-
nity)
γmin 10
Maximum Recovery Rate (Full Immu-
nity)
γmax 40





All rates are per year. rβ is initially set to 0.07/yr (i.e., it takes 10 years
to reach 50% susceptibility) in figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5 and for results in
manuscript unless another waning rate is explicitly stated. In Figure 3.4,
rβ = 0.04/yr and rβ = 0.10/yr for slow and fast waning, respectively.
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populations move across age categories instantaneously. Formally, every 6 months,





Qi,j−1, j ∈ [1, 9]
Qi,9 +Qi,10/2, j = 10
Qi,j−1/2 +Qi,j/2, j ∈ [11, 19]
Qi,19/2 + 9Qi,20/10, j = 20
Qi,j−1/10 + 9Qi,j/10, j ∈ [21,m− 2]
Qi,m−2/10 +Qi,m−1, j = m− 1.
(B.8)
For clearer analysis and presentation, we normalized the population size, N0, to 1
by finding the equilibrium value of birth flow, b, into compartment S0,0.
B.4 Modeling waning immunity
B.4.1 Waning immunity theoretical formulation
We conceptualized infection immunity regarding three aspects of the infection
process: 1.) β, susceptibility to infection; 2.) θ, contagiousness when infected; and
3.) γ, recovery rate of illness. To implement the effect of immunity, we allowed these
parameters to vary depending on immune status. When an individual has never ex-
perienced infection, they are fully susceptible to infection and then, if infected, they
are fully contagious with a maximum duration of infection. After an infection, in-
dividuals recover into a complete immunity state, where they have no susceptibility.
If infection were possible in this stage (that is, ignoring zero susceptiblity), there
would be no contagiousness and a maximum recovery rate of illness. We therefore
defined β and θ to represent relative levels of susceptibility and contagiousness be-
tween these extreme immunity levels, specifically allowing them to range between 0
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(no susceptibility or contagiousness) and 1 (full susceptibility and contagiousness).
Infection recovery rate, γ, is not defined relatively but it is based on observed ranges
of excretion duration [14, 49].
The waning of immunity is a dynamic process that starts at some maximal level
of immunity that generally decreases over time until it reaches some minimal level.
To allow our infection parameters to vary over time as immunity wanes, we defined
them as processes, β(t), θ(t), and γ(t), that vary over time, t, the time since infection
recovery. Assuming the maximal level of immunity occurs at the time of infection
recovery (t = 0), waning immunity is depicted as having the minimum susceptibility,
contagiousness, and duration assigned when t = 0 and then allowing each to increase
as time since infection increases. Since we defined β and θ such that they represent
relative levels of susceptibility and contagiousness that vary between 0 and 1, we
defined β(t) and θ(t) such that at t = 0 these parameters are equal to 0 (no sus-
ceptibility or contagiousness) and then allow them to approach 1 (full susceptibility
and contagiousness) as time since infection increases. We defined γ(t) to start at
a maximum recovery rate (minimum duration), γmax, when t = 0 and approaches
a minimum recovery rate (maximum duration), γmin, when time since infection in-
creases. We modeled the change over time in these infection parameters assuming
that immunity wanes exponentially with corresponding rate parameters, rβ, rθ, and
rγ. The following equations describe the exponential function for each parameter
β(t) = 1− e−rβt (B.9a)
θ(t) = 1− e−rθt (B.9b)
γ(t) = γmin + e
−rγt(γmax − γmin) (B.9c)
Figure B.1 shows curves for varying rates of susceptibility immunity waning and
transmissibility, a product of contagiousness and duration. Transmission potential is
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an aggregate measure of susceptibility and transmissibility discussed in further detail
in section B.5.1.
Figure B.1:
Immunity levels over time depicted by a) an average immunity profile
after infection for a newly infected individual with susceptibility immu-
nity waning rate of 0.07 yr−1 and b) transmission potential across vary-
ing susceptibility immunity waning rates. Transmissibility is a product
of contagiousness and duration. Transmission potential is a product of
transmissibility and susceptibility.
B.4.2 Waning immunity model implementation
We conceptualized immunity levels as continuous but for practical computational
purposes we grouped the population into n immunity stages where each stage, i,
corresponds to a specific time since infection recovery. The immune stages are indexed
using integers 0 through n− 1, where 0 represents no immunity (due to no previous
exposure), n− 1 represents maximum immunity achieved immediately after recovery,
and 1 represents the lowest stage to which immunity wanes over a specified time
frame. The level of immunity at each waning stage (except for 0) was estimated by a
series of times since infection. We did not allow further waning once level 1 is reached
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so that we can distinguish the never infected from those with little immunity who
were previously infected or vaccinated. Immunity waning only occurred across the
susceptible population, Si. To determine the average duration in each immune state,
we selected flow rates, ωi, between each susceptible compartment. The expected





1/ωk where 0 < i < n− 1. (B.10)
Note that for i = n − 1, flows into the susceptible compartment do not depend
on waning but on the recovery rate from infection so we let tn−1 = 0. Further, since
we assumed there is no waning into or out of S0, we do not need to consider ω0 or t0.
The expected arrival times into each Si compartment that we assigned are illustrated
in figure B.2 and table B.1. The model structure is illustrated in figure 3.1 in the
main text.
We used the expected arrival times to assign values at each immune stage for
each of our infection parameter, βi, θi, and γi (susceptibility, contagiousness, and
recovery rate, respectively). For populations with no immunity (i = 0) we assigned
the following values
β0 = 1 (B.11a)
θ0 = 1 (B.11b)
γ0 = γmin (B.11c)
For other levels of immunity, these parameters were a discrete series of values
calculated from our continuous immunity waning functions, equations (B.9a)-(B.9c),
using the set of arrival times we calculated in equation (B.10). They are calculated
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Figure B.2:
The expected arrival times into each susceptible compartment. S0 is not
included in this figure because it is not part of the waning process. The
duration in each compartment, i.e., distance between each point, was
determined by the parameterizations of ωi (see B.1).
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as follows (where 0 < i ≤ n− 1)
βi = β(ti) (B.12a)
θi = θ(ti) (B.12b)
γi = γ(ti) (B.12c)
B.4.3 Waning immunity robustness
Our model of waning immunity was fairly robust to more complicated formula-
tions. We considered using a two rate exponential process (fast waning then slow
waning) for each infection parameter, a better match for the actual biological pro-
cesses. However, the dynamics are robust (results not shown) to either formulation
so we used a one parameter exponential function to increase computation speed and
clarity of results. We selected ωi such that the underlying continuous curve would be
well represented in our discretized model, as can be seen in figure B.2. The results
(not shown) were also robust to increasing the total amount of waning stages.
We also examined a range of maternal immunity formulation options. The shorter
the duration or the less effective that maternal immunity is, the greater the poten-
tial for intensified childhood vaccinations to eliminate transmission and the higher
the level of vaccination of older individuals that is needed to eliminate transmission.
To clearly explore the interplay of dynamics of childhood vaccinations levels, repro-
duction number, OPV transmissibility and waning rates we decided to present the
simpler model that does not have maternal immunity.
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B.5 Supplemental results
B.5.1 Waning immunity exploration
As a starting point, we fixed waning immunity rates across susceptibility, conta-
giousness, and duration as follows: susceptibility increases to 50% compared to no
immunity after 10 years and reaches 84% after 25 years on average (corresponding
to S1). To simplify this process and characterize it using one parameter, we make
the following assumptions about the waning rates of these processes: 1) susceptibility
immunity wanes faster than contagiousness and duration immunity because infection
and excretion processes are only relevant after infection occurs; and 2) contagiousness
and duration have equal waning rates because shedding magnitude and duration are
intrinsically tied. We therefore set the exponential rates in which contagiousness and
duration increase (rθ and rγ, respectively) to be one fourth the rate in which suscep-
tibility increases (rβ). We use one fourth for convenience. Although changing these
relative rates may quantitatively affect the role of waning immunity in transmission,
it does not qualitatively affect our results. All three factors result in an overall re-
duction of transmissibility for a re-infected individual. This can be seen in figure B.1.
Parameters values for waning are also shown in table B.1.
Figure B.1 illustrates the potential immunity profiles for poliovirus infection we
used in our models to assess different levels of waning immunity. Figure B.1a shows
loss of immunity over time for one setting of susceptibility immunity waning. Trans-
missibility is a product of both potential recovery rate and contagiousness. We defined
transmission potential as the product of susceptibility and transmissibility. Maximum
transmission potential occurs in a susceptible individual who has never experienced
infection, and all concurrent transmission potential is relative to this state. In the
example of 0.07/year waning rate (figure B.1a), we had a fairly fast increase of suscep-
tibility but these subsequent infections will have a reduced effect on overall transmis-
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sion (transmission potential) due to a reduced contagiousness and duration of illness
(transmissibility). Figure B.1b illustrates transmission potentials for the range of dif-
ferent susceptibility waning rates we explored (bolded) in our analysis. This shows a
wide range of immunity waning from fairly conservative estimates to high estimates
without assuming that complete loss of immunity occurs.
B.5.2 Alternative implementation of vaccination
Our model utilized effective vaccination rates instead of real vaccination rates in
the model implementation. In reality, OPV vaccination may not always induce an
immune response and, if it does take, it may not induce a complete immune response
[48, 49]. We assumed an effective vaccination results in full immunity, thus we can still
evaluate reduced vaccine take-rates by reducing the effective vaccination rate. For
example, one effective vaccination per year compared to 0.75 per year might imply a
reduced take-rate. However, our model does not account for induced immunity that
is incomplete. It has been shown that it takes 3 or 4 doses of OPV to achieve full
immunity in an immunologically naive individual [48]. To explore the sensitivity of
our model assumptions to this multiple dosing property, we constructed an alternative
model where OPV vaccination (or transmission) does not result in full immunity upon
recovery unless there has been a previous infection by WPV or prior multiple OPV
doses. Specifically, in the absence of WPV, we assumed that three doses of OPV are
required to reach full immunity as depicted in figure B.3.
We ran a similar set of analyses as those presented in the main text utilizing the
new model construction. Comparing the results depicted in figure 3.2 in the main
text to the results from this model (figure B.4) we see remarkable consistency over a
similar scale of vaccination rates. The threshold for elimination is still observed across
vaccination rates given an R0 value but there is a subtle shift in this model requiring
slightly higher vaccination rates to reach threshold. Further, while it is difficult to
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identify visually, the alternative model formulation shows more robustness of preva-
lence levels to increases in vaccination for a given R0. That is, in the main model, we
sometimes observe drastic reductions in prevalence (many orders of magnitude) for a
tenth increase in the yearly effective vaccination rate, specifically near the threshold
for elimination. In the alternative model, reductions in prevalence are constrained to
one or two orders of magnitude for a tenth increase in vaccination.
In our model construction, we see that the interruption of WPV transmission
due to OPV vaccination and transmission plays a very important role in reaching
elimination threshold. In other words, the competition of the two infections without
co-infection allows vaccination with poor immunogenesis to still effectively reduce
WPV transmission. In reality, the actual vaccination rates are also affected by vari-
able take-rates in certain regions. The alternative vaccination implementation, while
giving us a real vaccination rate per year, is still an overestimate of efficacy of vac-
cination because we have not explicitly included fail rates, i.e., instances where the
vaccination fails to take at all. To better implement actual vaccination rates, there
would also need to be a fail rate (a proportion reduction in the implemented vac-
cination rate that actually results in OPV infection). This would translate into a
rescaling of the vaccination rate scale for a broader and great range. For example,
if we use a take-rate of about 33%, then 9 vaccinations per year would be required,
on average, to achieve the results we see in 3/yr in our alternative formulation. It
should be noted that this transformation could also be applied to the effective vac-
cination rates used in the main analysis. While exploring these facets of vaccination
may give us a better interpretation of the vaccination rate, they introduce additional
complication without changing the inferences we draw from our model concerning the
waning of immunity and the transmission of OPV. Specifically, the alternative for-
mulation of the model requiring multiple doses to achieve full immunity does not add
any additional information that is not captured by the use of the effective vaccination
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rates.
We use effective vaccination rates to reduce complexity regarding vaccine take-
rates and incomplete immunity. We can interpret our effective vaccination rate heuris-
tically in several ways. For a 0.5/year effective vaccination rate, the targeted country
is achieving 50% immunity (relative to full immunity) in the children population per
year. For 2/yr, there is full coverage of the childhood population with an additional
booster to full immunity per year. While this is not a direct mapping to the actual
vaccination rates, we can loosely categorize countries given their efforts in terms of
vaccination coverage (i.e., if they are achieving 100% coverage) and the extent to
which they are boosting these populations (e.g., implementation of SIAs).
B.5.3 Effect of vaccination implementation time
Figure B.5 depicts the effect of increasing the vaccination implementation time
(to 10 years) on minimum prevalence compared to the vaccination implementation
time of 2 years used in the manuscript. Specifically, the left panel of figure B.5 is the
same as figure 3.2A in the main text. For increased implementation times, minimum
prevalence levels increase for higher R0 levels with higher vaccination rates. Specifi-
cally, this reduces the initial efficacy of vaccination programs in highly transmissive
regions even when the eventual target vaccination rates are high. Furthermore, fig-
ure B.6 displays how minimum prevalence is affected by differing waning and OPV
transmission settings using a 2-year vaccine implementation time. Figure B.7 shows
the minimum prevalence for differing waning and OPV transmission settings using
a 10-year vaccine implementation time. Comparing figures B.6 and B.7 we see the
ability to reduce prevalence to low levels from initial vaccine implementation is highly
sensitive to the speed of implementation when immunity wanes more quickly. This
effect is magnified when OPV transmissibility is low.
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B.5.4 Model dynamics after vaccination
From figure 3.2 in the main manuscript, we observe that the introduction of vac-
cination can reduce prevalence to low levels (figure 3.2A) that are not necessarily
permanent at steady state (figure 3.2B), particularly as we increase levels of R0. The
dynamics that distinguish the high R0 from the low R0 situations have complex de-
pendencies upon the level of vaccination, the R0, the pace at which vaccination is
initially ramped up, and the waning dynamics modeled. As discussed in the main
manuscript, at high R0, previously infected individuals are constantly having their
immunity boosted by reinfections and the sharp drop in infection levels after vac-
cination implementation depends upon these high levels of immunity. As immunity
wanes, if we have not achieved the threshold of elimination, reinfection dynamics take
over the transmission system and we experience rebound epidemics.
At low levels of infection, stochastic events will dominate whether or not infection
dies out. If it does die out, then a whole set of issues not included in our deterministic
models will determine whether or not infection is reintroduced. But the solutions of
the differential equations can provide insights nonetheless. In general, the longer it
takes to get a rebound in the deterministic model, the longer the average time to a
stochastically determined rebound. That is because the immunity levels of those not
getting directly vaccinated are determinants of rebounds in both the deterministic
model, whose results we present here, and the more realistic stochastic model, which
we do not examine.
Figure B.8 presents the WPV prevalence at the peak of the first rebound epidemic
as a function of R0 and effective vaccination rates. Figure B.9 presents the time after
a vaccination program was initiated that the first rebound epidemic occurs. At low R0
levels the size of the rebound epidemic decreases as the vaccination level is increased,
but at higher R0 levels, the size of the first rebound epidemic may at first go up
and then go down as vaccination levels are further increased. Specifically, for higher
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R0 levels, when we compare the minimum prevalence achieved from figure 3.2A with
the 5% OPV transmission panel of figure B.8, we observe that the threshold where
minimum prevalence begins to reach very low levels (but we do not have elimination
at steady state) correspond to the conditions where we also have the highest rebound
epidemic prevalence. Furthermore, in conjunction with figure 3.5, we see that the
highest rebound peak levels correspond with the transition of transmission burden
from first infection to reinfection. In figure B.9, the time until the rebound epidemic
peak is fairly invariant for low levels of vaccination (less than 50 years) but slowly
takes longer as we increase vaccination and the magnitude of the rebound epidemic
diminishes.
If there is a strong rebound, the failure to eradicate will be evident. However, if
there is a smaller rebound epidemic, as we see for higher vaccination levels at high R0
values, then the failure to eradicate may not be so evident. This would indicate that
in areas like India, a declaration of elimination should only follow a very extensive
search for asymptomatically infected individuals.
B.5.5 Switching to IPV
Lastly, figure B.10 displays the minimum and final prevalence levels when relative
OPV transmissibility is 0% (a proxy for an IPV program) for three levels of waning.
Compared to figure 3.2a from the manuscript, we see with IPV there is a larger range
of R0 values where it becomes impossible to achieve elimination even for high levels of
vaccination coverage. This further emphasizes the importance of OPV transmissibility
and reducing transmission conditions in the context of switching to IPV. When R0














Alternative formulation of vaccination model for susceptible populations
(Si) and vaccinated populations (Vi). This figure excludes vital dynamics
and infection from wild polio virus (WPV), which are included in the sim-
ulated transmission model. In the presence of only vaccination rate (φ)
or force of infection due to oral polio vaccine (OPV) transmission (ΛV ),
three vaccinations or infections would be required to reach the highest
level of immunity (S9). Reduced OPV infectious period (γ) relative to
WPV infection is denoted by κ. Infection from WPV (not shown) is
assumed to result in full immunity prior to waning and thus subsequent
OPV exposures act as boosters. Flows between state variables Si denote
waning immunity described in section B.4 and also shown in the main
manuscript in figure 3.1 (with WPV infection).
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Figure B.4:
a) Minimum prevalence and b) final prevalence. Two panels depict preva-
lence levels across R0 and vaccination rates under the conditions of 5%
relative transmissibility of OPV and waning such that it takes 10 years
to reach 50% susceptibility. Panel a) depicts the minimum prevalence
reached in the first 50 years due to the initial implementation of a vac-
cination program, a measure of short-term success. Panel b) shows the
final prevalence resulting from a vaccination program, a measure of long-
term success. In constrast to the model presented in the main text, this
model requires multiple OPV doses to reach full immunity.
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Figure B.5:
Two panels depict minimum prevalence levels across R0 and vaccination
rates under the conditions of 5% relative transmissibility of OPV and
waning such that it takes 10 years to reach 50% susceptibility specifically
comparing 2-year vaccination implementation time (the left panel) to 10-
year vaccination implementation time (the right panel). The right panel
is presented in the main text in Figure 3.2A. This figure illustrates how
vaccination program implementation speed can induce reaching threshold
through initial prevalence reduction.
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Figure B.6:
Sensitivity analysis for minimum prevalence across reproduction numbers
and vaccination rates for varying waning rates and OPV transmissibility
when vaccination implementation time is equal to 2 years. The top panel
label is the susceptibility waning rate (0.07 was used in the manuscript de-
scribed as 10 years to reach 50% susceptibility). The bottom panel label
is relative OPV transmissibility (%) compared to WPV transmissibility.
That is, comparing figures horizontally changes OPV transmissibility for
a given waning rate and comparing figures vertically changes waning rate
for a given relative OPV transmissibility.
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Figure B.7:
Sensitivity analysis for minimum prevalence across reproduction numbers
and vaccination rates for varying waning rates and OPV transmissibil-
ity when vaccination implementation time is equal to 10 years. The
top panel label is the susceptibility waning rate (0.07 was used in the
manuscript described as 10 years to reach 50% susceptibility). The bot-
tom panel label is relative OPV transmissibility (%) compared to WPV
transmissibility. That is, comparing figures horizontally changes OPV
transmissibility for a given waning rate and comparing figures vertically
changes waning rate for a given relative OPV transmissibility.
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Figure B.8:
The size of rebound peak prevalence is presented in heatmap colors as
a function of vaccination rate, R0, and transmissibility of OPV. Waning
was set to take an average of 10 years to reach 50% susceptibility. In the
white areas of the graph, rebound peaks do not occur.
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Figure B.9:
The time (years) to rebound peak prevalence is presented as heatmap
colors as a function of vaccination rate, R0, and transmissibility of OPV.
Waning was set to take an average of 10 years to reach 50% susceptibility.
In the white areas of the graph, rebound peaks do not occur.
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Figure B.10:
Panels depict prevalence levels across R0 and vaccination rates under
the conditions of 0% relative transmissibility of OPV and three levels
of waning. The top three graphs correspond to minimum prevalence
after 2-year implementation of vaccination program. The bottom three
graphs display the final prevalence.
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APPENDIX C
Additional material for migration and polio
eradication
C.1 Model structure and equations
The construction of the this model, including waning immunity and aging, without
migration has been previously described in [86]. We extended this model by adding
migratory inflows for a separate population. This population is assumed to be in
steady state. In the manuscript, model parameters specific to migration are described
in table 4.1 and a visual depiction of the model can be seen in Figure 4.1.
The migration rate is denoted by α, the percent change in the population per year.
This is implemented in the model equations using the logarithm transformation so the
interpretation is a linear change over time rather than exponential (untransformed).
We assumed that migration occurs independently of infection and vaccination status
so we can group the state variables as follows,
Qi,j ∈ {Si,j, Ii,j, Vi,j} (C.1)
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where Qi,j is a general state variable in the model for a given immune stage, i,
and age group, j. The differential equations for Qi,j have been previously described
in chapter III. To describe migration in the model we consider two populations, the
source and the destination. The source and destination population vary with respect
to vaccination rates, φj, and contact rates, c. Furthermore, the source population is
in steady state. We let Q∗i,j denote the source population. The differential equation
for migration in the destination population is therefore
dQi,j
dt
= . . .+ log(1 + α)Q∗i,j − log(1 + α)Qi,j (C.2)
where the unlisted portion of the equation is identical in structure to the model in
chapter III. The differential equations were solved numerically using Python software
set with lsoda method and variable tolerance (absolute and/or relative) ranging from
1×e−8 to 1×e−12.
C.2 Supplementary results
In sections C.2.1 and C.2.2, we categorize success using prevalence directly. Min-
imum prevalence reached within 50 yeras of vaccine implementation is an indicator
of short-term success. Long-term success can be measured as the final prevalence at
steady state. Discrepancies in short and long-term success identify conditions where
initial vaccination may be effective but long-term stability may be fragile. For use in
sensitivity analyses, actual prevalence levels allow us to make more general inferences
about migration under varying parameter conditions.
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C.2.1 Migration and varying waning rates
The effect of migration on prevalence levels is generally not differential for different
levels of waning immunity rates (figures C.1 and C.2. The general inferences described
in the main results sections are robust, specifically that increasing vaccination rates
in the source population are important to achieving short and long-term success in
moderate to high transmission conditions.
Success, as it depends on waning immunity, is fairly robust to migration rates.
Under slow waning conditions (infection and vaccination induce long-lasting immu-
nity), achieving elimination in the short and long-term is achievable under much lower
vaccination requirements than when waning is faster. Under conditions of fast waning
immunity, reaching low prevalence in high transmission conditions is a result of effec-
tively implementing a vaccination program. Compared to the no migration model,
achieving low prevalence requires intense vaccination of the source population as well.
While the effects of waning rates do not necessarily depend on migration, waning im-
munity is still an important component of polio transmission as demonstrated here
and in our previous model [86].
C.2.2 Migration and higher OPV transmissibility
In Nigeria, there is circulation of cVDPV of strain similar to WPV type 2 [46]. The
type 2 vaccination strain is known to be more transmissible than the other vaccination
strains [18] and we previously demonstrated that achieving elimination in short and
long-term is much less difficult at higher OPV transmissibility [86]. Thus, cVDPV
type 2 in Nigeria may imply that vaccination rates and coverage are very low. To
assess how migration affects the transmission system when OPV is more transmissible
we allowed OPV to be 20% as transmissible as WPV (figures C.3 and C.4).
For higher OPV transmission, poor vaccination rates in the migratory popula-
tion can make achieving low prevalence levels in the short and long-term difficult
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Figure C.1:
Minimum prevalence under migration across similar popula-
tions. Minimum prevalence for two similar populations (same R0) across
vaccination and R0 in the destination population while varying migration
rates and vaccination rates in the migratory population. Waning rates
were varied between slow, medium, and fast corresponding to 17, 10, and
7 years to reach 50% susceptibility, respectively.
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Figure C.2:
Final prevalence under migration across similar populations Fi-
nal prevalence for two similar populations (same R0) across vaccination
and R0 in the destination population while varying migration rates and
vaccination rates in the migratory population. Waning rates were varied
between slow, medium, and fast corresponding to 17, 10, and 7 years to
reach 50% susceptibility, respectively.
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when migration rates are high. However, compared to the main analysis when OPV
transmissibility was only 5% compared to WPV, this detriment is almost entirely
attenuated when vaccination rates in the source population are increased. Even for
high migration, short and long-term success is possible at almost all R0 levels.
In the context of Nigeria, the persistence of cVDPV type 2 implies that there is
poor vaccination coverage. Our analysis demonstrated that this is exacerbated when
there is high migration. However, because OPV transmissibility is higher for type 2, a
general increase in vaccination coverage (rates and targeting) may be who initial suc-
cess that remains stable. Therefore, achieving eradication of type 2 (vaccine-derived)
could be an immediately attainable goal with better implementation in Nigeria and
proper cessation of vaccines that includes type 2 (e.g., tOPV).
C.3 Discussion on modeling migration
Afghanistan has a highly mobile population with up 15% of the population dis-
placed (internally or externally)[88]. This could translate into a variety of migra-
tion rates into surrounding regions. For example, Pakistan received about half of
Afghanistan’s migration over the past two decades [93]. However, using the differ-
ences in total population size (30m in Afghan to 190m in Pakistan), if 10% of the
Afghan population ends up in Pakistan due to displacement, that comprises only
about 1.5% of the total Pakistan population. On the other hand, the reverse in-
terpretation shows a small amount of migration from Pakistan could constitute a
significant proportion of the Afghanistan population. Current net migration projec-
tions are available for Nigeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, respectively, at rates of
-0.3, -1.4, and 4 per 1000 people per year with Afghanistan’s net migration rates are
expected to drop to 1.5 over the next few years [91]. For these data, -1.4/1000 person
years out of Pakistan corresponds to about 266,000 net people leaving per year, which
comprises about 1% of the total Afghanistan population size versus 0.1% of the total
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Figure C.3:
Minimum prevalence under migration across similar popula-
tions and high OPV transmissibility. Minimum prevalence for two
similar populations (same R0) across vaccination and R0 in the destina-
tion population while varying migration rates and vaccination rates in
the migratory population. Oral polio vaccine (OPV) is 20% as transmis-
sible as wild poliovirus (WPV). Waning rates were varied between slow,




Final prevalence under migration across similar populations and
high OPV transmissibility. Final prevalence for two similar popula-
tions (same R0) across vaccination and R0 in the destination popula-
tion while varying migration rates and vaccination rates in the migratory
population. Oral polio vaccine (OPV) is 20% as transmissible as wild
poliovirus (WPV). Waning rates were varied between slow, medium, and
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Vaccination effectiveness under migration from low transmis-
sion conditions. Short-term (left column) and long-term (right col-
umn) vaccination program effectiveness for a given effective vaccination
rate in the destination population across varying vaccination levels in
the migratory population (table 4.1) and migration rates. The migratory
population has a fixed and low R0 value of 4, oral polio vaccine (OPV)
is 5% as transmissible as wild poliovius (WPV), and waning rates were
set such it takes 10 years to reach 50% susceptibility. Vaccination ef-
fectiveness was measured, for a given effective vaccination rate, as the
maximum R0 (up to 20) where a target prevalence of less than 1 in a mil-
lion was reached. Initial effectiveness was measured using the minimum
prevalence within 50 year of program implementation and long-term ef-
fectiveness was measured using the final prevalence. The absence of lines
indicates that reaching the target prevalence was not possible under the
given conditions.
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Figure C.6:
Initial vaccination effectiveness under migration across vary-
ing transmission conditions. Vaccination program effectiveness for
a given effective vaccination rate in the destination population across
varying vaccination levels and transmission conditions in the source pop-
ulation (table 4.1) and migration rates. Initial vaccination effectiveness
was measured, for a given effective vaccination rate, as the maximum
R0 (up to 20) where the minimum prevalence (within 50 years) induced
by implementation of vaccination in the destination population was less
than 1 in a million. Oral polio vaccine (OPV) transmission was set to be
5% as transmissible as wild poliovius (WPV) and waning rates were set
such it takes 10 years to reach 50% susceptibility. The absence of lines




There many limitations to quantifying net migration rates and displacement pro-
portions into a transmission model. Net migration rates do not tell a complete story,
two nations with net migration rates of zero could have substantially different de-
mographic dynamics where one state may be relatively immobile and another could
experience large levels of both immigration and emigration. The total population dis-
placed provides a summary of the proportion of the population that lives outside the
nation or are mobile but do not provide appropriate time series data for implementa-
tion. For example, Afghanistan immigration occurred steadily over two decades but
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